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ARTICLES
DISCLOSURE, DECEPTION, AND DEEP-PACKET
INSPECTION: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ACT'S DECEPTIVE

CONDUCT PROHIBITIONS IN THE NET
NEUTRALITY DEBATE
Catherine . K. Sandoval*
This Article examines a largely unexplored frontier in the "Net
Neutrality" debate:
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act's
proscriptionsagainst deceptive conduct as a legal limit on Internet Service
Provider (ISP) discrimination against Internet traffic. ISP discrimination
against certain types of Internet traffic has blossomed since 2005 when the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), with the Supreme Court's
blessing in NCTA v. Brand X and FCC, relieved ISPsfrom common-carrier
regulations that prohibited discrimination and reclassified ISPs as
"information service providers." This Article argues that the Internet's
architecture and codes presumed common carriage, indicating that the
Internet's design and industry "self-regulation" cannot alone prevent ISPs
who control access to the Internet's physical layer from becoming its
gatekeepers. The FTC and FCC must use their respective authority to
police the gulf between ISP promises and practices,protect Internet users
and competition, and safeguard the Internet itself as a source for
innovation and a wide range of speech.
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In August 2008 the FCC condemned cable-based ISP Comcast's actions
that interfered with subscriber use of peer-to-peer Internet protocols to
legally sharefiles and access Internet content, practices that contradicted
Comcast's offer of unfettered Internet access. While that order is being
appealed and the FCC considers formal adoption of net neutrality
principles,this Article examines Comcast's actions in light of the FTCAct's
deceptive practices standards. It also analyzes the market promises and
terms of service of other cable, wireline, wireless, and satellite-basedISPs
to examine industrypractices that limit consumer choice and competition.
To protect Internet users and the Internet itself as a platform for
competition and new voices, the FCC should determine whether those
practices violate the Communications Act. This Article also recommends
that the FTC declare that ISP advertisements of unlimited data or Internet
access violate the FTC Act's deceptive conduct provisions when the ISP's
material limits on Internet use are not prominently highlighted in the ISP's
enticements to subscribers.
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I. INTRODUCTION: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT PROSCRIPTIONS OF
DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AS A RESTRAINT ON INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER
CONTROL OF INTERNET ACCESS

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said.
1
choose it to mean-neither more nor less."

"itmeans just what I

Where does unfettered mean restricted and unlimited mean limited? Not
in Wonderland but in the Internet domain, according to several Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs such as Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon
promised subscribers "unfettered" or "unlimited" Internet access. 2 Yet,
those same ISPs restricted Internet access through vague contractual
prohibitions and fine print separated from broad promises of Internet
access. 3 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found in 2008

1.LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 106 (Schocken Books 1987) (1872).
2. See INTERNET BUREAU, ATT'Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., IN THE MATTER OF
VERIZON WIRELESS:
ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE (2007) [hereinafter VERIZON

ASSURANCE

OF

DISCONTINUANCE],

available

at

http://www.oag.state.ny.us/

media center/2007/oct/Verizon%2OWireless%20AOD.pdf (requiring that Verizon cease
advertisements describing its Data Access Plan as "unlimited" when it imposed significant
limits and requiring restitution to affected consumers); Complaint 40, Hart v. Comcast of
Alameda, Inc., No. RG 07355993 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Hart
Complaint]
(on
file
with
the
author);
AT&T,
Messaging
&
Data,
http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/services/services=
list.jsp?catld=cat 1470003&LOSGId=&catName=Messaging+%26+Data&_requestid 10028
I ( nter zip code to obtain data plan information) (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
AT&T, Messaging & Data].
3. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,059 (2008)
[hereinafter FCC Comcast Order] (concluding that Comcast's interference with peer-to-peer
(P2P) and other applications did not constitute reasonable network management); VERIZON
ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE, supra note 2, para. 5 (stating that Verizon Wireless's terms
and conditions provided that customers could not use Verizon Wireless's Data Access Plan
to download movies, music, or games); AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms and
Conditions,
http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/messaging-internet/media-legal-notices.j sp
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009) [hereinafter AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms and Conditions]
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that cable-based ISP Comcast used deceptive practices to furtively delay or
block the use of certain Internet applications such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file
sharing services. 4 These restrictions contradicted ISP promises of unlimited
or unfettered Internet access that communicated to subscribers and the
marketplace adherence to the norm of "net neutrality," that the ISP would
not discriminate based on an Internet packet's origins or protocols.5 This
Article examines a largely unexplored frontier in the "net neutrality"
debate: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act's proscriptions against
deceptive conduct 6 as a legal limit on ISP discrimination against Internet
traffic.
ISPs provide access to the Internet backbone; absent regulation to the
contrary, their policies determine whether subscribers can access, post, or
share Internet content or use a variety of Internet applications. 7 The debate
about ISP control over Internet applications, or network management, is
important to the future of the Internet as a source for innovation and a wide
range of speech. 8 Will ISPs serve as gateways to the Internet or become the
Internet's gatekeepers?
The FTC has yet to condemn ISP practices that limit access to certain
Internet applications, despite an ISP's marketing promises of unlimited
access. The FTC's BroadbandConnectivity and Competition Policy Report
recommended caution in evaluating net neutrality proposals in light of the
dearth of evidence presented when the report was written in mid-2007

("While most common uses for Intranet browsing, email and intranet access are permitted by
your [AT&T] data plan, there are certain uses that cause extreme network capacity issues
and interference with the network and are therefore prohibited ....

includ[ing] ...

peer-to

peer (P2P) file sharing .... ").
4. FCC Comcast Order, supra note 3, at 13,028, 13,030-31; see also Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005) (peer-to-peer software
connects a computer user to a peer-to-peer network and makes any shared files available for
transfer to any other user currently connected to the same peer-to-peer network, without
requiring the use of a central server).
5. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, BroadbandDiscrimination,2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 145-46 (2003) (defining net neutrality as the principle that the networks that
carry Internet traffic should be neutral as among Internet applications). The Congressional
Research Service acknowledged there is no single accepted definition for net neutrality, but
stated that most agree it should include the principle that "owners of the networks that
compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use
that network[] and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that
network." ANGELE A. GILROY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NET NEUTRALITY:
BACKGROUND

AND

ISSUES

1-2

(2008),

available

at

http:/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22444.pdf.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (2006).
7. See THoMAs J. FALLON, THE INTERNET TODAY 21 (2001) ("ISPs, online service
providers . . . are directly connected to the [Internet] backbone, providing a connectivity
front end for virtually everyone else.").
8. See Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard,61 ADMIN.
L. REv. 1, 135 (2009) (advocating a public interest standard that "valorizes" broadband
Internet as "a vital tool for enhancing democracy; for enfranchising, engaging, and informing
a diverse electorate; and for enriching civic life").
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showing that ISP discrimination 9against Internet applications or sources was
more than a theoretical problem.
Examples of network non-neutrality blossomed after the FTC Broadband
Report's release. Consumers began complaining in mid-2007 that Comcast
delayed or blocked the use of P2P file-sharing applications.' 0 A user
seeking to download a file may use P2P to request content from other users
who may have all or a piece of that file, while those who have the requested
files upload them, allowing users to share data and computer resources.II
Companies such as NBC Universal, Comedy Central, National Geographic,
and the National Football League use P2P to make video available for user
viewing.' 2 Comcast limited P2P access in 2007 and 2008, although in 2007
it promised subscribers "unfettered access13to all the content, services, and
applications that the internet has to offer.'
Nor is Comcast alone in restricting access to content using P2P protocols.
In 2009, AT&T prominently advertised "unlimited" minutes for its
BlackBerry wireless data service but elsewhere prohibited P2P use for
video downloads of movies, and its Wireless Data Terms of service prohibit
"peer-to-peer (P2P file sharing)."'1 4 AT&T reserved the right to terminate
or change customer contracts if AT&T detected subscriber use of P2P on its
network. 15 Cable-based ISP Cox Communications reportedly blocked
many subscriber attempts to use P2P during 2007 and 2008, generating a
lawsuit based on several state and federal claims. 16 In 2009, Cox
Communications is testing a system to handle congestion by delaying or
slowing the transmission times of Internet traffic it classifies as non-time17
sensitive, including P2P, file transfer protocol, and software updates.

9. FTC STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, COMPETITION POLICY 9, 122
(2007) [hereinafter FTC BROADBAND REPORT] ("FTC jurisdiction over broadband comes
chiefly from its statutory mandate to prevent 'unfair methods of competition' and 'unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce'...." (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77)).
10. See FCC Comcast Order,supra note 3, at 13,030-31 & n.14.
11. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920
(2005).
12. See Press Release, Pando Networks, NBC Selects Pando Networks To Power TV
Downloads (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.pandonetworks.com/node/74.
13. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, 40.
14. AT&T, Messaging & Data, supra note 2; see AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms
and Conditions, supra note 3 ("[Clhecking email, surfing the Internet, downloading legally
acquired songs, and/or visiting corporate intranets is permitted, but downloading movies
using P2P file sharing services... is prohibited.").
15. AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms and Conditions, supra note 3.
16. Todd Spangler, Cox Accused of Blocking P2P, Too, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 15,
2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/89340-CoxAccused Of BlockingP2PToo.php;
see Lyons v. Coxcom, Inc., No. 08-CV-02047-H(CAB), 2009 WL 347285 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2009) (granting motion to dismiss complaint with leave to amend alleging that Cox
advertised fast internet speeds but limited or stopped P2P transmissions in violation of state
law consumer protection acts and laws prohibiting false and misleading advertising, unfair
acts, or practices, and the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
17. Cox Communications, Congestion Management FAQs (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.cox.com/policy/congestiomnanagement/.
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Until 2005, FCC common-carrier obligations prohibited ISPs from
deliberately discriminating against any Internet data. 18 With the Supreme
Court's blessing in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v.
Brand X Internet Services, the FCC relieved ISPs from common-carrier
obligations. 19 In that ruling's wake, ISPs have used both technology and
contract to constrain subscriber use of Internet applications. Deep-packet
inspection software examines Internet packets attempting to pass through an
ISP network and allows the ISP to "distinguish peer-to-peer traffic [or any
other Internet application they choose to track] ... and either block it or
reduce its available bandwidth."'2 0 Using deep-packet inspection, ISPs have
the technical power to cut off Internet applications "with a mere flick of the
21
switch."
To support those restraints, ISPs such as Comcast cited provisions in
their subscriber contracts that give the ISP the right to manage its network
and require that subscriber use not interfere with other subscribers. 22 Some
ISPs explicitly prohibit the use of P2P or other Internet applications, while
at the same time marketing their service as "unlimited. '2 3 Skype, a
provider of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications that uses P2P
to transmit voice "calls" or video conferences over the Internet, complained
to the FCC in October 2008 that its application was "forbidden, blocked and
otherwise
interfered
with
by the
largest
CTIA
[Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association] members." 24 For example, as
of September 2009 AT&T enticed online shoppers with its statement that

18. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000
(2005); see infra Part II.
19. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, 545 U.S. at 1000-01.
20. Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the
DigitalAge, 4 J.TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 92 (2005). The FCC found that Comcast

used deep-packet inspection to identify P2P sessions. FCC Comcast Order, supra note 3, at
13,050-51; PEERAPP, PEERAPP WHITE PAPER: ACCELERATING THE VIDEO INTERNET 6 (2008)

[hereinafter
ACCELERATING
THE
VIDEO
INTERNET],
available
at
http://www.peerapp.com/Data/Files/Accelerating theVideoInternet PeerAppLtd Januar
y_2008.pdf (stating ISPs use deep-packet inspection products to "sort out what applications
are running over their networks, so ISPs can fully understand the traffic demands of each
application, and then manage or 'shape' the traffic accordingly.").
21. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994) (upholding regulations that
require cable companies to carry the signals of over-the-air broadcasters to preserve
competition in light of cable's bottleneck control that enables them to exclude broadcasters).
22. Comments of Comcast Corp. at 39, Broadband Indus. Practices, No. 07-52 (Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n Feb. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Comments].
23. See AT&T, Messaging & Data, supra note 2 (prohibiting peer-to-peer file sharing as
an example of prohibited "Intranet" use); AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms and
Conditions, supra note 3 (prohibiting subscriber use of peer-to-peer file sharing).
24. Letter from Christopher Libertelli, Senior Dir., Gov't & Regulatory Affairs, Skype,
to Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC (Oct. 8, 2008) (requesting that the FCC act on Skype's
petition for rulemaking, RM 11361 (2007), contending that most wireless network operators
"continue to restrict VoIP and or P2P applications on their network," and requesting that the
FCC require wireless operators to open their networks to all legal applications).
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the data plan required for the iPhone "includes unlimited data in the U.S." 2 5
However, in its separate terms of service, which were not highlighted or
hyperlinked to its Internet marketing claims of "unlimited data," AT&T's
26
iPhone contract prohibits "Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing."
Sandvine, the company whose software Comcast deployed to limit P2P
use, stated that its examination of ISP traffic indicated that "P2P now
accounts for more than 40% of the total bandwidth. ' 27 PeerApp, a
company that offers products to make P2P use more efficient and less
bandwidth-intensive, noted that "P2P users have grown into one of the
largest communities in the online world with more than 10,000,000 P2P
users online at any given time."' 28 Bandwidth consumption from P2P use
exceeded client-server traffic (Internet transactions from a host that stores
files and delivers it on user demand at a website-YouTube, for example)
for the four years before 2007.29 Since 2007, as a result of the rise of
streaming videos such as YouTube and with the growth of high-definition
video sites such as Hulu "client-server traffic has retaken the lead from
peer-to-peer, constituting 45 percent of all internet traffic as compared with
30
37 percent of all traffic devoted to peer-to-peer."
PeerApp observed in 2007,
[W]ith the growing adoption of Broadband video delivery, where
numerous content owners are embracing and adopting P2P based content
delivery services, the problem is only going to be exacerbated and users
will be looking for 'real' unlimited bandwidth
packages and in many
cases will be willing to pay premium pricing. 3 1
PeerApp pointed out that "the majority of P2P users actually subscribe to
32
the highest bandwidth packages offered by the ISPs."
25. AT&T, iPhone 3GS-16 GB Cell Phone Package, http://www.wireless.att.com/cellphone-service/packages/packages-details.jsp?q_sku=sku3790233&q_package=sku3790236
(follow link to data plan for iPhone) (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
26. AT&T, Plan Terms, http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/packages/
packages-details.jsp?qsku=sku3790233&q_package=sku3790236 (enter zip code, then
scroll to the bottom of the following page and click hyperlink to "Plan Terms") (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter AT&T, Plan Terms].
27. SANDVINE INC., THE VALUE OF TRAFFIC OPTIMIZATION INA WORLD WITH NETWORK
NEUTRALITY
(2008)
[hereinafter
TRAFFIC
OPTIMIZATION],
available
at

http://www.sandvine.com/downloads/documents/TrafficOptimizationWhitepaperMay_2
008.pdf.
28. PeerApp, Solutions:
Transit Link Growth, http://www.peerapp.com/solutionsmanaging-transit-link-growth.aspx
Growth].

(last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Transit Link

29. Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 179, 192 (citing Press Release, Ellacoya Networks, Ellacoya Data Shows Web
Traffic Overtakes Peer-to-Peer (P2P) as Largest Percentage of Bandwidth on the Network
(June 18, 2007)); Nate Anderson, The YouTube Effect: HTTP Traffic Now Eclipses P2P,
ARs TECHNICA, June 19, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/06/the-youtubeeffect-http-traffic-now-eclipses-p2p.ars.
30. Yoo, supra note 29, at 192.
31. PeerApp, Solutions: Download Byte Caps, http://www.peerapp.com/solutionsmanaging-unlimited-bandwidth.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
32. Transit Link Growth, supra note 28.
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Prior to the revelation that Comcast and other ISPs blocked P2P use,
scholars debated about whether ISPs had an incentive to discriminate
against any Internet application in light of their economic motivations to
obtain and serve customers or to derive revenue from complementary
businesses. 3 3 The actions of Comcast, Cox, and other ISPs dramatically
demonstrate the reality and potential for ISP discrimination against Internet
applications. Moreover, incentives to discriminate may increase as the
economic downturn leads some households to cancel their cable video
34 ISP
service and watch video over the Internet in order to save money.
limits on the use of Internet applications or bandwidth undercut the viability
of substituting Internet service for cable service.
In August 2008, the FCC determined that Comcast's interference with
P2P and other types of Internet packets violated the Communications Act
and FCC Internet policy, which declared that "consumers are entitled to run
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law
enforcement" and "reasonable network management. '35 The FCC found
that Comcast's obstruction of lawful Internet applications did not constitute
reasonable network management. 36 That finding was based in part on
evidence that, in some areas, Comcast interfered with P2P traffic "24 hours
33. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and
Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet
Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 101 (2003) (identifying incentives to undermine an
application that can compete with the ISP's core platform as an exception to the principle
that ISPs will tend to "internalize complementary efficiencies"); Brett Frischmann &
Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information
Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 411 (2007) (arguing that
limited competition and incentives to keep secondary market revenues create incentives for
ISPs to discriminate); James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A
Critique of Open Access Rules for BroadbandPlatforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 84 (2000)
(asserting that where network effects are strong as in the broadband market, "even a
monopolist will have the incentive to encourage a wide variety of information services in
order to increase subscribership."); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1888 (2006) (contending that network owners
have an incentive to support complementary innovation that would increase the value of
their networks). "A monopolist generally has no incentive to 'extend' or 'leverage' its
monopoly into the market for complementary goods, because to do so would diminish
consumer demand for the monopoly good," decreasing total profits. Speta, supra, at 84.
34. Becky Worley, Cancel Your Cable and Still Watch Great TV, ABC NEWS, GOOD
MORNING
AMERICA,
Jan.
30,
2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Economy/
Story?id=6764960&page= 1.
35. FCC Comcast Order, supra note 3, at 13,028, 13,046-47; see Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615(b) (2006); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006)) (amending
the Communications Act of 1934); Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Policy Statement,
(Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC260435Al.doc. The FCC's 2005 Intemet policy statement articulated four principles to
"encourage broadband" and promote an "open and interconnected" Internet. Id. Those
principles declared the following: "consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet
content of their choice; ... consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices
that do not harm the network; ...

and ...

consumers are entitled to competition among

network providers, application and service providers, and content providers." Id.
36. See FCC Comcast Order, supra note 3, at 13,052-53.

HeinOnline -- 78 Fordham L. Rev. 648 2009-2010

2009]

FTC AND NET NEUTRALITY

a day, 7 days a week," belying claims that such practices were merely in
response to network congestion. 37 The FCC expressed concern that
Comcast's methods could harm competition and deceive consumers by
faulty, rather than notifying the
making it appear that the application was
38
busy.
was
network
Comcast's
that
user
Comcast is appealing the FCC's order, arguing that the FCC's Internet
policy was adopted without administrative notice and comment and did not
contain enforcement mechanisms. 39 The FCC grounded its order on several
provisions of the 1996 Act and the 1934 Act, and its authority to adjudicate
cases individually.4 0 The FCC did not fine Comcast since the FCC had not
37. Id. at 13,031-32.
38. Id. at 13,055-56, 13,058-59 ("Many consumers experiencing difficulty using only
certain applications will not place blame on the broadband Internet access service provider,
where it belongs, but rather on the applications themselves, thus further disadvantaging those
applications in the marketplace.").
39. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 4, 2008); see Barbara
Esbin & Adam Marcus, "The Law is Whatever the Nobles Do ": Undue Process at the FCC,
17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 535, 554 (2009) (arguing that the FCC does not have ancillary
authority under Title I of the Communications Act for its Comcast order and that the FCC's
Internet policy statement was not adopted through proper administrative procedures). The
FCC announced that at its October 22, 2009, Commission meeting it will consider a "Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on policies to preserve the free and open Internet." Press Release,
FCC, FCC Announces Tentative Agenda for Oct. 22nd Open Meeting (Oct. 5, 2009),
The
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-293833AI.doc.
FCC Chairman proposed that the Commission request comments on formally adopting
principles governing Internet regulation, four of which affirm that consumers must be able to
access lawful Internet content, applications, and services of their choice, and attach
nonharmful devices to the network," supra note 35, and that the Commission ask for
comments on two additional principles to "prevent Internet access providers from
discriminating against particular Internet content or applications, while allowing for
reasonable network management," and to "ensure that Internet access providers are
transparent about the network management practices they implement." Press Release, FCC,
FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski Outlines Actions To Preserve the Free and Open
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
available at
5,
2009),
(Oct.
Internet
attachmatch/DOC-293567Al.doc.
40. FCC Comcast Order,supra note 3, at 13,037-44. The FCC declared that it based its
jurisdiction to sanction Comcast's actions on statutory directives and authority, including
Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934, which "directs the Commission 'to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States... a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities
at reasonable charges."' Id. at 13,036 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151). The FCC emphasized the
Supreme Court's recognition in NCTA v. Brand X that "'the Commission has jurisdiction to
impose additional regulatory obligations [on information service providers] under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications,"' and that 'the
Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under
its Title I ancillary jurisdiction."' Id. at 13,035 (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996 (2005)). The FCC also grounded its authority to
reprimand Comcast's tactics on several provisions of the 1996 Act, including 47 U.S.C. §
230(b)(1), which sets forth a congressional policy of "'promot[ing] the continued
development of the Internet,"' id. at 13,033 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)) (alteration in
original); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), which articulates a Congressional policy of "encourag[ing]
the development of technologies [that] maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals ... who use the Internet," id. at 13,033 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(3)) (alterations and omission in original); the 1996 Act's prohibitions against
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previously announced its intention to issue fines or seek restitution for
injured parties in such adjudications. 4 1 The issuance and appeal of the
FCC's order and the FTC Act's ability to order restitution for deceptive
conduct highlight the importance of examining the FTC Act's constraints
on ISP behavior.
This Article examines the FTC Act's deceptive conduct provisions as a
legal limit on ISP discrimination against Internet traffic. Part II of this
Article argues that the FCC's common-carrier laws that prohibited
discrimination against voice and data traffic were critical to the Internet's
development. It examines the shift in 2005 to information service provider
regulation that provided the legal opening for ISP network discrimination,
as well as the foundation for FTC jurisdiction over ISPs.
As a case study of the FTC Act's deceptive conduct proscriptions, Part
III analyzes Comcast's promises to subscribers and the marketplace. It
examines the inadequacies of Comcast's disclosures to alert users to its

network management practices that deflected blame for the inability to
access Internet applications from Comcast's network congestion to the
Internet application the consumer was trying to access. It argues that no
amount of disclosure could excuse such practices. It also analyzes the
market promises and terms of service of other ISPs to highlight a range of
industry advertising promises and practices that merit FTC scrutiny.
Part IV explores the limited state of competition in the United States for
ISP access for computer users and the proliferation of ISP restraints on
Internet applications. These conditions limit the effectiveness of simply
encouraging better ISP disclosure to prevent deception and protect
competition. 42 While I agree that better disclosure is necessary, disclosure

practices that interfere with a common-carrier service, id. at 13,037-38 (citing 47 U.S.C. §
201(a)) (noting the possibility that Comcast's interference with its customers' uploads will
cause the computer trying to download to seek content from another computer connected to
the network of a common carrier, thereby increasing the traffic on that common carrier's
network); section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, which provides that the
"'Commission shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans,"' id. at 13038 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 157
note); the Act's requirements that the FCC take steps "'to promote nondiscriminatory
accessibility by the broadest number of users and vendors of communications products and
services to public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications
services' and 'to ensure the ability of users and information providers to seamlessly and
transparently transmit and receive information between and across telecommunications
networks,"' id. at 13,039 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 256(a)); and § 257 of the 1996 Act, which
"mandates that the Commission conduct an ongoing review to identify and eliminate 'market
entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership of
telecommunications services and information services, or in the provision of parts or
services to providers of telecommunications services and information services,"' id. at
13,040 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 257(a)) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 257(c)).
41. Id. at 13,047, 13061 n.248.
42. Cf Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality
Debate?, 1 INT'L J. CoMM. 493, 529 (2007) (advocating better ISP disclosure of policies and
Internet application limits in lieu of regulation or net neutrality legislation).
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alone will not ensure that the Internet remains a vibrant and competitive
source for a variety of voices and services.
Part V contrasts FTC Act deceptive practices standards with unfair
competition and antitrust laws. Unlike the Sherman Act and the FTC Act's
unfair competition laws, the FTC Act's deceptive practices standards and
the Communications Act enable the FTC and the FCC to redress deceptive
conduct, regardless of whether the entity engaging in such behavior has
monopoly or market power. These distinctions emphasize that antitrust law
should complement, not supplant, FTC enforcement action over ISPs, as
well as FCC regulation.
Part VI recommends that the FTC declare that advertising unlimited data
or Internet access while constraining Internet use and applications is
deceptive. The FTC and the FCC should require ISPs to disclose their
network management policies and the FTC must scrutinize those policies to
ensure they are not deceptive in light of the ISP's promises about the
breadth and extent of data or Internet access offered. 43 Where it finds
deceptive conduct, the FTC should initiate enforcement proceedings to
redress harms to consumers and Internet application developers. The FTC
should also declare that ISPs may not attempt to contract away user rights
under the FTC Act. Although this Article focuses on the deceptive
practices prohibitions of the FTC Act, it also suggests that the FTC examine
whether restrictive network management policies that limit the use of
Internet applications that compete with the ISP's other offerings constitute
45
44
unfair competition under the FTC Act or violate the Sherman Act.

This Article analyzes the jurisdictional line between FCC and FTC
responsibility regarding ISP practices. While a full exploration of FCC
policies is beyond this Article's scope, I suggest that as part of the FCC's
examination of broadband industry practices, 46 the FCC must determine
whether refusals to deal with Internet applications (which often contradict
promises of unlimited access) are inconsistent with the Communications
Act. Both the FTC and the FCC must act to protect Internet users and
competition, and to safeguard the Internet itself as a source for innovation
and a wide range of speech.

43. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontierfor Net Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 273, 293

(2008) (arguing that regulators should ensure that ISPs disclose the nature of their network
management practices to consumers).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006); see FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239
(1972) (The FTC has authority to "define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even
though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws .... )
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
46. Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, No. 07-52, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894
(2007).
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II. FROM COMMON CARRIAGE TO INFORMATION SERVICE PROVIDERS:
THE FOUNDATION FOR NETWORK NON-NEUTRALITY AND FTC
JURISDICTION OVER INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
47
This is the end... of our elaborate plans.., the end.

The arcane thicket of regulatory classification created the legal
foundation for the Internet's development. At its birth, Internet traffic was
protected by common-carrier regulations imposed on the telephone system
through which it was carried. 48 As Professor Christopher S. Yoo observed,
'4 9
"the Internet began as an application riding on top of a voice network.
The FCC in 1980, through its Computer II proceeding, affirmed that
facilities-based telecommunications providers would continue to be subject
to common-carrier obligations for the data traffic passing through their
network.5 0 Common carriage regulations forbade discrimination by the
voice network against traffic passing through the telephone network,
51
including nascent Internet traffic.
In its 1986 Computer III order, the FCC required "local telephone
companies that provided enhanced services to offer their wires on a
common-carrier basis to competing enhanced-service providers." 52 This
order effectively mandated telephone companies to make their lines
available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory, common-carrier terms.
Professor Susan P. Crawford observed that "[p]olicymakers fifty years
ago were concerned that common-carriage telephone companies would
control access to early computing services." 53 She noted,
To avoid this, regulators came up with the idea of categorizing new
computing services differently from basic common carriage
communications by calling these new services "data processing,"
47. THE DoORS, The End, on THE DooRs (Elektra Entertainment Group 1967).
48. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Intemet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976
(2005) (citing Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417-23,
86-101 (1980) (final decision)
[hereinafter Computer II Order]).
49. Yoo, supra note 42, at 502.
50. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976 (citing ComputerIt Order,supra note 48, ff 86-101).
51. The FCC determined in 1956 that AT&T could only offer common-carrier services.
United States v. W. Elec. Co., No. 17-49, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4076, at *3,*6 (D.N.J. Jan.
24, 1956) (restricting AT&T from offering anything other than "common carrier
communications services" and defining those services as "communications services and
facilities ...subject to public regulation"); see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000-01; Susan P.
Crawford, The Internet and the Projectof Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 372
(2007) (citing Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 3, 16 (FCC
Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 31,
1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/oppwp31 .pdf).
52. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 995 (citing Amendments of Sections 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 964 4
(1986)).
53. Susan P. Crawford, TransportingCommunications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 887, 89198 (2009) (the FCC's Computer Inquiries required common carriage to constrain telephone
company conduct that might restrict the computer marketplace).
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"enhanced services," or finally, "information services" (the current form
of words used for the same idea). This categorization and its
implementation was designed to protect the computing industry from the
depredations of the carriers. It was premised on the continued existence
54
of basic, general-purpose, non-discriminatory access and transport.
Professor Crawford characterized "non-discriminatory access to basic
communications" as a principle "carved in stone" for the '55past fifty years
since "[a]ll other services depended on this basic transport.
These regulations stemming from the Computer Inquiries, along with
other FCC decisions, led to a proliferation of independent ISPs that
competed to offer dial-up Internet service through telephone facilities. 56 As
the telephone network evolved and telephone companies offered Internet
access through digital subscriber lines (DSL), the FCC also required the
telephone companies "to make the telephone lines used to transmit DSL
service available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory, common-carrier
terms." 5 7
Common-carrier regulations fostered competition for
independent ISPs, and prohibited those who controlled access to the
Internet's physical layer from discriminating against nascent Internet
content or applications.
The FCC's insistence on nondiscriminatory access obligations, Professor
Philip J. Weiser observed, "ensure[d] that the telecommunications network
could be used for a variety of services (e.g., Internet access) and that rival
companies could market equipment like modems that could connect to the
network."'58 Vinton G. Cerf, one of the renowned fathers of the Internet,
noted that as a result of the FCC's Computer Inquiry decisions "thousands
of players were free to unleash their creative, innovative, and inspired
product and service ideas in the competitive information services
marketplace, without artificial barriers erected by the local telephone
59
companies."
The Internet was enabled through the creation, dissemination, and
common use of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP),
launched in 1977 to allow disparate networks to connect through a common
computer language. 60 TCP/IP serves as the lingua franca of the Internet,
the computer code that enables computers and networks to communicate,
54. Id. at 887.
55. Id. at 886.
56. See, e.g., Oxman, supra note 51, at 17 & n.45 (stating that in 1999 over 6000 ISPs
offered dial-up service to the Internet and 95% of Americans had access to four local ISPs).
57. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1000.
58. Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.

L. 1, 12 (2002).
59. Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Senior Vice-President, WorldCom, Inc., to the
Honorable Donald Evans, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, and the Honorable Michael
Powell, Chairman, FCC (May 20, 2002), available at http://www.broadband.gr/content/modules/downloadsbroadband letter.doc.
60. See STEPHEN SEGALLER, NERDs 2.0.1, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET 111-13
(1998) (stating that TCP/IP protocol allowed the interconnection of packet-switching
networks).
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forming an interconnected Internet. 6 1 The fact that no one "owns" TCP/IP
and its openness were critical to the Internet's success. 62 Empowered by a
common protocol for Internet applications, it seemed that permission was
not required from those who controlled the Internet's physical layer or from
any other party to post an Internet application and create a better virtual
63
mousetrap.
The Internet has been described as a layered model that facilitates
competition between Internet applications. 64 Professor Lawrence B. Solum
and Minn Chung observed, "When information is communicated via the
Internet, the information flows down from the content layer (the 'highest'
level) through the application, transport, IP and link layers to the physical
layer (the 'lowest' level); across the physical layer in packets; and then
flows back up through the same layers in reverse order." 65 These "layers"
were seen as key to the Internet's openness since no one controlled the
content layer.
In imaging the Internet's design, J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed, and D.D. Clark
argued that the Internet's "intelligence" should be placed at its ends where
users put applications and information into the network and choose what to
draw from the network,66 articulating what became known as the Internet's
"end-to-end" principle.
This design contrasted with the closed nature of
the telephone system where its owners decided what features to make
61. INFO. SCIS. INST., RFC 793, TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET
PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 3-4, 15, 16 (1981), http://www.apps.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc793.html [hereinafter RFC 793] (explaining TCP's primary purpose as the following:
"to provide reliable, securable, logical circuit or connection service between pairs of
processes," and to transfer streams of data between users by packaging data into "segments
for transmission through the Internet system"). The protocol's designers noted that Internet
Protocol carries several information fields, including the packet's source, the destination host
address, and the Protocol carried within. 1d.; see also Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust
Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality
Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L., 19, 22 n.5 (2009) (citing Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development, FNC Resolution: Definition of
"Internet" (Oct 30, 1995), http://www.nitrd.gov/fnc/Intemetres.html). The Oct. 24, 1995,
resolution of the Federal Networking Council stated that "'Internet' refers to the global
information system that--(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space
based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to
support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Intemet Protocol (TCP/IP)
suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii)
provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered
on the communications and related infrastructure described herein." Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development, FNC Resolution, supra.
62. See Oxman, supra note 51, at 3, 16.
63. See id. at 12.
64. See Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED.
COmm. L.J. 587, 600 (2004).
65. Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 815, 816 (2004).
66. See J.H. SALTZER, D.P. REED & D.D. CLARK, END-TO-END ARGUMENTS IN SYSTEM
DESIGN (1981), available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/
endtoend.pdf.
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available on the network and controlled its "intelligence. ' 67 The Internet's
"end-to-end" architecture was touted as a design that allowed applications
to develop and flourish on the Internet without seeking permission from the
gatekeepers of the physical network or Internet participants. 68 The
Internet's structure reflects the Internet developers' strategy that "no central
'69
gatekeeper should decide which applications could be provided.
Professor Kevin Werbach critiqued the end-to-end model for its emphasis
on "only one side of the equation-the edges." 70 He recognized that the
"Internet gives extraordinary power to its endpoints, but it also embodies
linkages between those endpoints .

. .

. The fact that the edges of the

network define the applications say nothing about how those edges are
wired together."'7 1 He commented, "An endpoint can offer a brilliant
innovation, but puch innovation will be of no value if other endpoints
72
cannot access it, or cannot access it easily."
Exaltations of the Internet's layered model, its "end-to-end" architecture,
and lack of ownership of TCP/IP protocol as the cornerstones of the
Internet's success leave unspoken the role of the FCC's common-carrier
regulations in protecting the separate roles of the Internet's layers. TCP/IP
protocol and the Internet's "end-to-end" architecture facilitated the ability
to post and access a variety of content on the Internet, while the FCC's
common-carrier requirements safeguarded those features.
Professor Lawrence Lessig's famous 1999 aphorism "Code is Law"
argued that the "code" which controls the Internet effectively creates the
Internet's architecture and its "laws." 7 3 Lessig observed, "We can build, or
architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are
fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow
those values to disappear. '74 "Code is Law" suggested that the Internet's
architecture or code checks government control over the Internet and the
75
ideas carried on it (or the values embedded in it).
"Code is Law" did not explicitly acknowledge the role of commoncarrier laws in enabling Internet applications to flourish. "Code is Law"
takes on new meaning in the twenty-first century when those who control
67. Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 933 (2001).
68. See id. at 932; see also James B. Speta, A Common CarrierApproach to Internet
Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 274 (2002) ("[T]he technical configuration of the

Internet makes the development of many new applications easier, because application
developers do not need to conform their data streams to any particular protocol and because
the TCP/IP inter-networking protocols do not interact with the applications protocols.").
69. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 33, at 90.
70. Kevin Werbach, The CentripetalNetwork: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces TearingIt Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 343, 399 (2008).
71. Id. at 399-400.
72. Id. at 400.
73. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 7 ("[T]he lack of ownership" of the code of cyberspace and "the presence of a
commons-is key to limiting, or checking, certain forms of governmental control.").
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access to the physical layer that connects to the Internet can and do use
those same codes, as well as codes they insert and often do not disclose, to
control Internet traffic. Suddenly, Code is Control, and can be used not
only to manage networks, but also to discourage the growth of applications
that may compete with the established revenue streams of those who control
access to the Internet's physical layer.
Professor Lessig proclaimed "Code is Law" when common-carrier
requirements still restrained ISP behavior. The Internet's design assumed
ISPs and those who controlled the Internet's transmissions lines would not
purposefully discriminate against a lawful Internet application. Commoncarrier regulations protected that expectation. Freed from such regulations
in 2005, the vaunted architecture of the Internet, the elaborate plans which
prevented its cooptation by any layer, application, content or user, are
undermined by the ability of ISPs who control access to the physical layer
to exercise control over access to applications and content. This is so in
large part because the Internet's architecture presumed common carriage.
Professor Mark Lemley and Professor Lessig expressed their concern
about the potential for ISP discrimination if the FCC shifted its regulatory
treatment of those who provide access to the Internet. 76 "Innovation," they
predicted, "will be chilled if a potential innovator believes the value of the
innovation will be captured by those that control the network and have the
power to behave strategically. '77 Prognosticating the current debate about
regulation of 1SPs, Professors Lemley and Lessig noted, "[i]f that strategic
actor owns the transmission lines itself, it has the power to decide what can
'78
and cannot be done on the Internet."
The physical layer's neutrality toward Internet traffic can no longer be
presumed after the FCC alleviated ISPs from common-carrier regulations
that required them to treat all traffic traveling through their network without
discrimination. 79 In 2002, the FCC changed the regulatory classification
for cable broadband ISPs to "information service" providers. 80 To justify
its action, the FCC cited § 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
which charged the Commission with "'encourag[ing] the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans' by 'regulatory forbearance, measures that promote
competition or other regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment."' '8 1 In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's reclassification of cable broadband as an information service
provider in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
76. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 67, at 947.
77. Id. at 932.
78. Id.
79. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974
(2005); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802, 4819 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Internet Ruling].
80. Cable InternetRuling, supra note 79, at 4802.
81. Id. at 4840 (quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 157, 230(b) (2006))).
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Internet Services,82 deferring to what the Court concluded was the FCC's

reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms that Congress
83
delegated to the agency the power to interpret.
The FCC's 2002 decision to reclassify broadband provided by cable
companies as an information service instead of a common-carrier service
did not examine whether information service providers could discriminate
against Internet traffic. Nor was this issue addressed in the Brand X
decision since Brand X, a Santa Monica, California-based ISP, wanted
access to cable broadband to provide a competitive alternative for
consumers, much like the way telephone companies had to carry
84
competitive ISPs such as Earthlink or AOL.
Subsequent to the Brand X decision, the FCC reclassified telephonesystem-based ISPs as information service providers.8 5 It also reclassified
ISPs using other means, such as wireless or broadband-over-powerlines, as
information service providers. 86 Scant attention was paid to whether this
shift would encourage or permit discrimination against Internet traffic
carried through these networks. The FCC did, however, request public
comment on whether it should impose additional requirements on ISPs
87
under its Title I jurisdiction provided by the 1934 Act.
Relieved from common-carrier regulation and empowered by deeppacket inspection that allows ISP computers to scrutinize the packets of

Internet traffic passing

through

their network, 88 Comcast's

actions

82. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
83. Id. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996),
which stated that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), established a "presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved,
first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows").
84. See id. at 995, 1000.
85. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853
(2005).
86. Press Release, FCC, FCC Classifies Wireless Broadband Internet Access Service as
an
Information
Service
(March
22,
2007),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-271695AI.pdf; Press Release, FCC,
FCC Classifies Broadband Over Power Line-Enabled Internet Access as "Information
Service"
(Nov.
3, 2006),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-26833 1A 1.pdf.
87. See AppropriateFramework,20 F.C.C.R. at 14,929-35,
146-59 (2006). Title I of
the 1934 Act authorizes the FCC to "regulat[e] interstate and foreign commerce in
communication." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
88. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1261344#
(describing deep-packet inspection methods that allow an ISP to examine Internet traffic at
the packet level). Professor Ohm also argues that deep-packet inspection and other methods
to "sniff' Internet packets violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and
the Wiretap Act. Id. (manuscript at 65-66) (citing ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified in various parts of Title 18); Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511-2520)). Examination of the
legality of deep-packet inspection is not necessary to determine whether ISP practices are
deceptive under the FTC Act's deceptive or unfair practices jurisdiction, but should be taken
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invigorated the debate about whether ISPs should be required to treat
Internet traffic in a neutral manner. 89 Professor Rob Frieden pointed out
that "[tlhe ability to 'sniff packets makes it possible for ISPs to deviate
from 'best efforts' routing by discriminating on the basis of price paid for
90
service and as a function of what kind of traffic a bitstream represents."
These practices highlight the clash between the open Internet standards of
TCP/IP protocol that made it easy for anyone to develop an application to
run on the Internet when ISPs were subject to common-carrier regulation,
and the closed network management standards, technologies, and
contractual provisions that restrict use of certain applications in the absence
91
of common-carrier laws.
Professor Paul Ohm argues that "ISPs have the opportunity, means, and
motive to engage in new forms of customer surveillance." 92 The
opportunity, Ohm writes, stems from "the design of the network, as ISPs
operate network chokepoints giving them the ability to access every bit
leaving from and returning to a customer's computer." 93 Improvement in
computer processing power and new software enable inspection of every
packet. 94 Professor Ohm also points out that "economic pressures and the
lack of ethical counterweights motivate them [ISPs] to sniff more
95
packets."
I argue that the removal of explicit legal prohibitions against Internet
traffic discrimination, not just economic incentives and the lack of ethical
norms, made deep-packet inspection proliferate. Computer power and
software technologically enabled inspection of every packet, but the
removal of common-carrier nondiscrimination requirements created the
legal space for ISPs to take action based on that information. The Internet's
architecture cannot heal this problem through self-regulation because the
Internet's designers assumed that the physical layer that provided access to
and carried Internet data would be neutral and simply transport data across
the network. The Internet's design presumed common carriage. The FCC

into account in evaluating whether such inspection is an unfair competition tactic. The FCC
should consider the allegation that such methods violate the ECPA and the Wiretap Act to
determine whether ISP network management techniques are unreasonable or unlawful.
89. See Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias? - Handicappingthe Oddsfor a Tiered
and Branded Internet,29 HASTINGs COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 210 (2007) ("ISP port blocking

strategies should be deemed impermissible by telecommunications service providers and
information service providers alike absent a compelling justification, e.g., preventing the
dissemination of harmful content such as a virus."); Lemley & Lessig, supra note 67, at 955.
90. Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 642 (2008).

91. See Free Press, et al., Comments at 4, 8, WC Docket No. 07-52, (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Feb. 13, 2008).
92. Ohm, supra note 88, at 25.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
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and the FTC must now decide whether such discrimination is prohibited
under information service provider regulation.
The FCC's 2005 case against Madison River Telephone Company
illustrates the significance of the regulatory distinction between common
carriers and information service providers.
In Madison River
Communications, LLC, the FCC entered into a consent decree with the
Madison River telephone company to prohibit the company from blocking
consumer access to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services to make
voice "calls" over the Internet, a service which could compete with the
telephone company's services. 96 When the FCC decided Madison River, it
still classified telephone-based ISPs as common carriers, subjecting them to
rules prohibiting discrimination among traffic carried on a common-carrier
network. 97 If Madison River had been classified as an information service
provider, common-carrier nondiscrimination rules would not have governed
that case. In the absence of common-carrier rules for ISPs, the FCC would
have been required to determine whether Madison River's conduct violated
any other provisions of the Communications Act or other FCC rules or
policies, as it did with the complaint against Comcast.
The FCC's reclassification of cable modem and other ISPs as
information service providers also subjected them to the FTC's jurisdiction.
Although the FTC does not have jurisdiction over common carriers, the
FTC shares jurisdiction with the FCC over entities classified as information
service providers. 98 The FTC Act created a common-carrier exception to
its enforcement power, in deference to the Communications Act of 1934
and its amendments. 99 The FTC has determined that "[a]n entity is a
common carrier only with respect to services it provides on a common
carrier basis."' 100 Thus, if an entity, such as a traditional telephone
96. Madison River Communications, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4295, 4297 (2005)
(adopting a consent decree to terminate an investigation into the compliance of Madison
River Communication, LLC with section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934).
Section 201(b) requires that for common carriers "[a]ll charges, practices, classifications,
and regulations for and in connection with such communication service shall be just and
reasonable." 47 U.S.C. § 201(b); see Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic
Frameworkfor Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329,
346 (2007) ("[E]xclusion in the VolP market serves to preserve the network provider's
current profits.").
97. Madison River, 20 F.C.C.R. at 4295.
98. See FTC BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
99. FTC v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2006).
100. Nuechterlein, supra note 61, at 51 n.99 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)). 47 U.S.C. §
153(44) states that a provider of telecommunications services is deemed a common carier
under the Communications Act "only to the extent that it is engaged in providing
telecommunications services." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2006). Nuechterlein argues that ISPs
do not automatically fall outside of the common-carrier exemption, and thus under the FTC's
concurrent jurisdiction, because of the FCC's continued attempts to regulate them under
Title I of the Communications Act. Nuechterlein, supra note 61, at 52. Title I, however, is
not based on common-carrier regulations and the FCC's post-Brand X orders removing
nondiscrimination obligations were explicitly intended to reclassify ISPs as information
service providers, not common carriers, thus creating a Venn-diagram-like area of shared
jurisdiction between the FTC and the FCC based on their respective regulatory authority.
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company, offers some services under its classification as an information
service provider and others under its classification as a common carrier, the
FTC has jurisdiction over that entity's acts as an information service
provider. The FTC's concurrent jurisdiction with the FCC over information
service providers creates another avenue to address the effects of ISP
practices on competition and consumers.
A decade ago, the FTC encouraged ISPs to adopt subscriber privacy
policies, a model Professors Weiser and Yoo cite to suggest that the FTC
should encourage ISPs to more fully disclose their network management
policies. 1 1 Professor Steven Hetcher cites public-choice theory that
suggests government agencies "seek to maximize their power, size, and
prestige" to explain the FTC's actions promoting Internet privacy
policies. 10 2 The FTC's privacy policies, Professor Hetcher argued, allowed
"the Agency to sink its jurisdictional hooks more firmly into the Internet
10 3
privacy debate, and therefore the Internet."
As discussed above, the FCC's regulatory reclassification of ISPs as
information service providers gave the FTC jurisdiction over deceptive and
unfair conduct and unfair competition involving ISPs. The public choice
theory does not explain why the FTC has not acted to police the growing
gap between ISP promises and practices. 10 4 This Article brings attention to
the need for FTC enforcement action in this realm. I urge the FTC to
initiate a deceptive conduct investigation to hold ISPs accountable for
practices that undermine their promises to consumers and the marketplace
about the breadth and extent of Internet access offered.

101. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 43, at 289; Yoo, supra note 42, at 529.
102. Steven Hetcher, The FTC as InternetPrivacy Norm Entrepreneur,53

VAND.

L. REv.

2041, 2044 (2000).

103. Id. at 2046.
104. The FTC's inaction might be explained in part by the potential voting deadlock on

the FTC created in the wake of the resignation of FTC Chairperson Deborah Platt Majoras,
who led the FTC's examination of broadband practices that resulted in its 2007 report. Since
March 2008, the FTC has had four members and now has a Democratic Chairperson, a
Republican member, an Independent member, and one Democratic member. See FTC,
Commissioners, http://www.ftc.gov/commissioners/index.shtml (follow link to the pages for
each Commissioner) (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). Political affiliation alone may not fully
explain the FTC's inaction. In June 2008 Republican Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch gave
a speech contending that Comcast's actions in blocking P2P, despite the company's
promises of broad internet access, were deceptive and unfair under the FTC Act. J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Broadband Access Policy: The Role of Antitrust
(June
13,
2008)
[hereinafter
Rosch
Broadband
Speech],
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080613broadbandaccess.pdf
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III. THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR AN FTC ACT DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
CLAIM EXAMINING INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER PROMISES AND
NETWORK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
You made me Promises, Promises, You knew you'd never keep,
10 5
Promises, promises, why do I believe?
10 6
The facts alleged in a suit against Comcast by subscriber Jon Hart

provide a case study of the legal issues that should be examined through an
FTC Act deceptive practices claim based on the gap between ISP promises
and practices. Hart's case was stayed in July 2008 by the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California pending the FCC's decision in
the matter, which the court determined might affect the basis for the breach
of contract claims, and then consolidated with five other cases involving six
plaintiffs challenging Comcast's interference with P2P in light of the
company's advertising claims. 107 Hart alleged breach of contract, several
claims based on state law prohibiting deceptive and unfair practices, as well
as violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal claim.10 8 Hart
and Comcast proposed in April 2009 to settle the case, a motion the six
other class action plaintiffs oppose on the grounds that it provides
inadequate monetary relief, does not reach all affected members of the
class, fails to contain an order for injunctive relief that would prohibit
Comcast from interfering with subscriber use of P2P in the future, or
require Comcast to reveal its congestion management policies regarding
105. PETER BYRNE, ROBERT FISHER & NAKED EYES, PROMISES, PROMISES (Emi-Capitol

Special Markets 1998).
106. Hart Complaint, supra note 2; see Hart v. Comcast of Alameda, No. C 07-6350 PJF,
2008 WL 2610787, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008). Hart's case was initially filed in
November 2007 in California state court as a class action, then removed to federal court on
Comcast's motion.
107. Hart, 2008 WL 2610787, at *1 (citing Davel Commc'ns Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 460
F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006)) (applying the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine under which
courts may determine that initial jurisdiction resides in an administrative agency, and ruling
that the FCC has primary jurisdiction to determine some of the issues underlying Hart's suit
such as the reasonableness of Comcast's network management actions). In December 2008,
Hart v. Comcast was consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation concerning six cases
challenging Comcast's interference with P2P in light of the company's advertising claims.
In re Comcast Corp. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Transmission Contract Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1381,
1382 (J.P.M.L. 2008) ("All actions share factual questions arising out of allegations that
Comcast (1) slowed, delayed or otherwise impeded peer-to-peer (P2P) transmissions sent
using its broadband highspeed internet service (HSIS) (even though it advertised 'unfettered'
access), and (2) failed to disclose this practice to its subscribers.").
108. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, 1-4. Hart filed state claims under sections 17203
and 17535 of the California Business and Professions Code (providing for injunctions and
restitution for unfair and deceptive practices); section 17500 of the California Business and
Professions Code (prohibiting false and misleading advertising); California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act, section 1750 of the California Civil Code; a federal claim under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; and alleged breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Hart Complaint, supra note 2,
at 11-19. Comcast filed an appeal of the FCC's order in 2008, extending the resolution of
the FCC claims that may affect Hart's action and the other complaints in the consolidated
case. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 4, 2008).
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P2P. 10 9 While these claims continue to be litigated, the FTC should
consider whether restitution or injunctive relief is merited based on the FTC
Act's deceptive conduct provisions to address the alleged harms from ISP
interference with Internet subscriber use in contravention of an ISP's

marketing promises.
The FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in interstate
commerce and unfair competition."10 An act has been held to be deceptive
if it involves a material representation, omission, or practice that is likely to
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. II
Deception claims often focus on whether advertisements omit material
information or are misleading. 12 The FTC Policy Statement on Deception
lists examples of practices that have been found to be misleading or
deceptive, including false oral or written representations and failure to
13
perform promised service. 1
An FTC Act deceptive conduct complaint is not a breach of contract

allegation.11 4 The FTC may examine statements that induced consumers to
109. Counsel for Hart filed a motion to settle the case in April 2009. Plaintiffs Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement, Conditional Certification of Class,
Selection of Class Counsel, Approval of Notice Plan, and Setting Settlement Fairness
Hearing, In re Comcast Corp. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Transmission Contract Litig., No. 2:08md-01922-LDD (E.D. Pa. April 14, 2009). Six of the seven class members filed a motion
opposing that settlement on the grounds that it provided inadequate relief to the class
members; though the proposed settlement would require Comcast to pay $16 million,
recovery for individual subscribers who are class members would be limited to $16 each.
Plaintiffs' Opposition to The Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement
Agreement Filed on April 14, 2009 at 3-4, In re Comcast Corp. Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
Transmission Contract Litig., No. 2:08-md-01922-LDD (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2009). The
plaintiffs opposing the proposed settlement emphasized that it contained no injunctive relief
prohibiting Comcast from "blocking class members' access to P2P protocols in the future,
nor does it contain any guarantee that Comcast will inform class members or the general
public of its P2P management practices on a prospective basis." Id. at 4.
110. FTC Act, 38 Stat. 717, § 5(a)(1) (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)).
111. FTC v. Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); FTC v.
Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003); Telebrands Corp., 140 F.T.C. 278, 290
(2005), aff'd, 457 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2006); Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65
(1984).
112. See CliffdaleAssocs., 103 F.T.C. at 175.
113. Id. at 164-65 (citing FTC Policy Statement on Deception, (Oct. 14, 1983)
[hereinafter
FTC
Policy
Statement
on
Deception],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm).
114. FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The
FTC is empowered to initiate federal court actions to enforce violations of section 5" of the
FTC Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,"
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), and to "seek appropriate equitable relief," 15 U.S.C. § 53(a)-(b).).
Since the FTC Act creates a separate cause of action not based on breach of contract, the
parol evidence rule would not apply to prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to
interpret an unambiguous, integrated, written contract. See Certain British Underwriters at
Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 789 F.2d 1534, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986); Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Peterson v.
Lexington Ins. Co,, 753 F.2d 1016, 1018 (1lth Cir. 1985)). The FTC Act's deceptive
conduct standards do not seek to interpret the parties' contract or determine whether a
contract was breached. The FTC's deceptive conduct provisions examine whether the
advertising or representations that induced the contract or transaction were misleading in
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enter into a contract, whether or not that statement was included in the
Cox Communications subscriber Lynn Lyons's complaint
contract.
alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violation of state law consumerprotection claims, as well as the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
was dismissed with leave to amend for, among other things, failing to allege
what contractual provision required Cox to provide unlimited Internet
access or was violated by Cox's interference with her use of P2P
protocols.11 5 Lyons's complaint focused on Cox's advertising claims that it
provided "blazing fast" speeds and "always-on connection with speed to
download in seconds, not minutes."1 16 For her state law breach of contract
claim, the district court distinguished between advertising statements and
contract clauses, finding deceptive advertising allegations insufficient to
establish a breach of contract. 117 The FTC Act's deceptive-conduct
provisions look beyond the square terms of the contract to the advertising
and other material statements that induced the purchase of the goods or
service.
The Act's prohibitions against unfair or deceptive practices apply to
Internet advertising, marketing, and sales, as well as to advertising on other
media. 118 FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, in a June 2008 speech,
emphasized the need for clear and conspicuous disclosure of material
information about Internet access, and stressed that a unilateral change of
contract terms may be unfair under the FTC Act. 1 19
To be proscribed under the FTC Act, a challenged representation must be
"contrary to fact." 120 Advertisements need not be literally false to be
condemned under the FTC Act, because "[lt]he impression created by the
advertising, not its literal truth or falsity, is the desideratum." 12 1 The FTC
122
analyzes whether advertisements are "misleading in a material respect"'
123
and weighs the adequacy of disclosure.
The FTC Act does not allow private parties to sue in federal court to
enforce it as does the Sherman Act. 124 Instead private parties must file a

light of the disclosures at the time of the transaction. FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
supra note 113.
115. Lyons v. Coxcom, Inc., No. 08-CV-02047-H(CAB), 2009 WL 347285, at *6-7 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 6, 2009).
116. Id. at *6.
117. Id. at *7.
118. U.S. v. Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing FTC, DOT
COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING (2000) [hereinafter FTC DOT
COM DISCLOSURES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/

bus41 .pdf).
119. Rosch Broadband Speech, supra note 104, at 6.
120. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supranote 113, at 164-65 n.4.
121. FTC v. Med. Billers Network, 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 1982)).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2006).
123. See id.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 7.
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complaint with the FTC.' 25 The FTC may also investigate and bring an
enforcement action on its own motion. 126 The FTC Act provides a distinct
statutory basis for a complaint that may proceed alongside the FCC
investigation and the resolution of state and other federal law claims
regarding ISP practices and promises.
A. FTCAct Deceptive PracticesClaim: False MaterialRepresentation
To be deceptive under the FTC Act the representation must be
material. 127 A material claim "involves information that is important to
consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding,
a product."' 12 8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that the
Commission has "historically presumed materiality for certain categories of
claims: (1) all express claims, (2) intentional implied claims and (3) claims
that

. .

. 'concern[] the purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost of the product or

29
service,"' or "its 'durability, performance, warranties or quality.'"1
Hart contended that Comcast promised its prospective customers
"unfettered access to all the content, services, and applications that the
internet has to offer."' 130 Hart alleged that Comcast "intentionally and
severely impede[d] the use of certain internet applications by their
customers, slowing such applications to a mere crawl or stopping them
altogether.' 13 1 Hart cited the blocking or slowing of peer-to-peer
32
applications and Lotus Notes as examples of such impediments. 1
Promises of "unfettered access to all the content, services, and
applications that the internet has to offer"' 133 fall within the FTC Act's
requirement of an express or implied representation. The FTC Policy
Statement on Deception declared that the Commission "generally will not
pursue cases involving obviously exaggerated or puffing representations,
i.e., those that the ordinary consumers do not take seriously."' 134 Comcast's
promise of unfettered Internet access does not seem like obvious puffing
because it characterizes the breadth and extent of Internet service offered.

125. See Morales v. Walker Motors Sales, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790 (S.D. Ohio

2000) (holding there is no implied private right of action under the FTC Act provisions
prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or affecting commerce).
126. FTC BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 (noting the FTC has brought a variety
of cases against ISPs that have engaged in allegedly deceptive marketing and billing
practices).

127. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 176 (1984).
128. Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Cliffdale
Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 165).

129. Novartis Corp., 223 F.3d at 786 (citing Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 182).
130. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at9.
134. Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 181 ("' [Tlhere is a category of advertising themes, in
the nature of puffing or other hyperbole, which do not amount to the type of affirmative
product claims for which either the Commission or the consumer would expect
documentation."' (quoting Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972))).
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Compliance with that promise can be measured by whether the ISP is
engaging in acts to "fetter" or impede Internet access to "all the content,
services and applications the internet has to offer." 135 Such promises are an
actionable representation under the FTC Act.
Hart could also base an FTC Act claim on the portions of Comcast's ad
that promise speeds of 6 Megabytes per second (Mbps), "up to 4 times
136
faster than 1.5 Mbps DSL and up to twice as fast as 3.0 Mbps DSL."'
The promise of speeds of 6 Mbps is a concrete representation in light of the
surrounding high speed claims. As express claims about the speed and
extent of Internet service offered, these are material claims under the FTC
Act.
B. FTCAct Deceptive PracticesClaim: RepresentationMust Mislead
Consumers Acting Reasonably Under the Circumstances
The second factor in the FTC Policy Statement on Deception queries
whether the representation is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably
under the circumstances. 137 The test of reasonableness considers whether
the claim was directed to any particular group, such as children or the
elderly, or to consumers in general, and evaluates the reasonableness of the
138
complaining consumer's reaction in light of the representation.
Comcast's advertisements soliciting Internet subscribers were directed at
the general population. As such, the complaint would be assessed in light
of the reaction of the average consumer, although FTC Act complaints have
been upheld when the perception of a minority of consumers indicates that
39
a representation was misleading.1
Hart contends in his federal case against Comcast that he relied on the
company's advertising representations about speed and the nature of the
unfettered service in deciding to subscribe.140 Hart "upgraded" his Internet
service to Comcast's "High Speed Internet Performance Plus," 14 1 paying
more for that tier based on Comcast's promise that he would receive fast,
"unfettered" Internet service. Hart contended that the promised speed was a
major reason for subscribing because it would allow him to use applications

135. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
136. Id.
Mbps refers to megabytes per second. See VERIZON ASSURANCE OF
DISCONTINUANCE, supra note 2, n.3 ("One byte usually contains enough information to

convey or store just one character (such as the letter 'a'). A 'gigabyte' equals approximately
one billion bytes, or approximately one thousand 'megabytes'

. . .

. Static webpages often

contain less than one megabyte of data, while a three minute video clip on YouTube might
contain approximately four megabytes of data.").
137. CliffdaleAssocs., 103 F.T.C. at 176.
138. Id. at 179-82.
139. Id. at 177 n.20 ("An interpretation may be reasonable even though it is not shared by
a majority of consumers in the relevant class, or by particularly sophisticated consumers. A
material practice that misleads a significant minority of reasonable consumers is
deceptive.").
140. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
141. Id.
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such as P2P, which require fast Internet speeds. 142 Hart's subscription to a
higher tier of Internet service in order to access P2P is consistent with
PeerApp's observation that "the majority of p2p users actually subscribe to
43
the highest bandwidth packages offered by the ISPs.'
In 2008, Comcast offered several tiers of Internet access services, each
promising higher Internet speeds at higher prices per tier. 144 The promise
of more services for a higher monthly fee validates consumer impressions
that the subscriber will receive additional services in exchange for paying
more for the higher speed tier. This indicates that the speed and access
claims are material representations that influenced the consumer's choice or
conduct and are actionable under the FTC Act.
C. Defenses to an FTC Act Deceptive PracticesClaim: Disclaimers,
Disclosure,and Reasonable Consumer Action
1. Disclosure: Were Comcast's Disclosures Sufficient To Alert Users to
the Material Limits on Internet Service?
In evaluating the reasonableness of the consumer's reaction to a material
representation or promise, the FTC evaluates the relevant advertisement and
transaction as a whole. 145 A solicitation may be likely to mislead, however,
"by virtue of the net impression it creates even though the solicitation also
contains truthful disclosures."' 146 In FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation,147 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that an
advertisement's description of cigarette tar content was deceptive even
though fine print in the comer of the advertisement truthfully explained
how the tar content was measured. 4 8 Inconspicuous disclosures may be
insufficient to correct misleading representations. 149 The Brown &
Williamson court reasoned that "consumers were unlikely to read the fine
1 50
print in the comer of the ad."'

142. Id.
143. Transit Link Growth, supra note 28.
144. Doug Mohney, Comcast Speed and Price Increase in Pipeline, FIERCETELECOM,

Oct.
18,
2008,
http://www.fiercetelecom.com/story/comcast-speed-price-increasespipeline/2008-10-20 (reporting that Comcast would offer in Fall 2008 three tiers of service,
the Economy offering speeds of 768 Kbps/384 Kbps (download/upload speed) for $24.95 a
month, 6 Mbps/1 Mbps for $42.95 a month, and 8 Mbps/2 Mbps at $52.95 per month).
145. FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).
146. FTC v. Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Stouffer Foods Corp., 118 F.T.C. 746, 799 (1994) (noting that the FTC also considers the
overall impression the ad created).
147. 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
148. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
149. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 180 n.34 (1984) (citing Giant Food, 61
F.T.C. 326, 348 (1962) (fine-print disclaimer was inadequate to correct a deceptive
impression)).
150. Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F.3d at 1200 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
778 F.2d at 43).
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The FTC's Dot Com Disclosure Guidelines state that to prevent an ad
from being misleading, disclosures "to ensure that consumers receive
material information about the terms of a transaction or to further public
policy goals, must be clear and conspicuous."' 15 1 The FTC explained,
In evaluating whether disclosures are likely to be clear and conspicuous in
online ads, advertisers should consider the placement of the disclosure in
an ad and its proximity to the relevant claim. Additional considerations
include: the prominence of the disclosure; whether items in other parts of
the ad distract attention from the disclosure; whether the ad is so lengthy

that the disclosure needs to be repeated; whether disclosures in audio
messages are presented in an adequate volume and cadence and visual

disclosures appear for a sufficient duration; and, whether1 the
language of
52
the disclosure is understandableto the intended audience.
Thus, placement, proximity, and prominence are key factors for effective
disclosure.
Hart avers that when he signed up for Comcast's Internet service, any
disclosures or limits were not prominently explained. 153 Instead, as part of
the sign-up process, a scroll window opened with the Comcast High-Speed
Internet Subscriber Agreement. 154 Only 10 to 15 lines of text were visible
at one time, according to Hart, who pointed out that if all of the text were
pasted into a word document it would total "22 pages of single-spaced
text."'1 55 Hart claimed that "none of the terms of service state that Comcast
can or will impede, limit, discontinue, block or otherwise impair or treat
differently the Blocked Applications" such as P2P. 156 Hart insists that at
the time he signed up for service there were no disclosures to temper the
statements about the unfettered nature of Internet access to the full range of
57
content and applications the ISP promised.1
The FTC evaluates the placement of disclosures in proximity to the
relevant advertising claim. 158 Even if the disclosures in the scroll screens
adequately explained the limitations on the services offered (and the facts of
Hart's case indicate they did not), their placement in a separate document
accessible only by clicking through dozens if not hundreds of computer
screens does not satisfy the FTC standard for proximity or conspicuousness
151. FTC DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 118, at 1.
152. Id.
153. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, at 9-10.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 9-10. Hart defined "Blocked Applications" as peer-to-peer file sharing and
Lotus Notes. Id. at 1. Lotus Notes is software that facilitates communication and
collaboration. IBM, Lotus Software, http://www-306.ibm.com/software/lotus/ (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009).
157. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, at 9-10.
158. FTC DOT CoM DISCLOSURES, supra note 118, at 1. Disclosures must be clear and
conspicuous to prevent an ad from being misleading, ensure that consumers receive material

information about the terms of a transaction or to further public policy goals. See generally
FTC v. Five Star Auto Club, Inc., No. CIV-99-1693, 2000 WL 1609798 (S.D.N.Y. June 12,

2000); Palm, Inc., No. C-4044, 2002 WL 663657 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Apr. 17, 2002).
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in relation to the ad's material claims. The inadequacy of such disclaimers
is underscored by their limited detail as well as their separation.
Professor Barbara van Schewick testified to the FCC that Comcast's
website as of April 2008 did not direct customers to an acceptable use
policy informing consumers about the limits they could expect for their
Internet access. 159 She noted that a pop-up window emerged when a Web
user clicked on "terms and conditions. ' 160 That window simply stated,
"Service is subject to terms and conditions of Comcast High-Speed Internet
Subscriber Agreement and Home Networking Amendment if applicable.
For restrictions, minimum requirements and details about service and
prices, call 1-800-Comcast.' 16 1 Although this alerts potential subscribers to
possible restrictions, it provides no details about those restrictions to
balance any representations about the products offered. This vague notice
about possible restrictions does not comport with the FTC Act's
requirement for proximity, clarity, and conspicuousness of any disclaimers
in relation to material claims or promises.
Similar issues arise from AT&T's advertisements for its three tiers of
BlackBerry service and the limits on that service described in a separate
document. 162 The BlackBerry Personal plan offers "unlimited data to
instantly connect you to email, the web and so much more. ' 163 The
description of the offered services does not highlight limits to the
"unlimited" data service offered. Those limits are found by scrolling down
to the bottom of the screen to the area marked by an asterisk for "Mobile
Banking" and the notation "Additional charges may apply. See terms and
conditions for details," and then clicking on the link for terms and
conditions. 164 There is no asterisk to call attention to the limits on the
unlimited data service. A potential subscriber would have to guess that the
terms referenced next to the notation for the additional charges for mobile
banking may contain restrictions on unlimited data that are found after
clicking "See terms and conditions for details."' 165 Those terms of service

159. Written Testimony of Barbara van Schewick at the FCC's en bane Hearing on

Broadband Network Management Practices at 3, No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Apr.
17,
2008)
[hereinafter
van Schewick
FCC Testimony],
available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/van%20Schewick%20FCC%2OWritten%2OTestim
ony%20April%2017%202008.pdf.

160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Comcast, Product Terms and Conditions, Performance with PowerBoost®
(Speeds Up to 12 Mbps), http://www.comcast.com/Shop/Buyflow/default.ashx?Popup=
true&RenderedBy=Products&FormName=ProductTermsandConditions&ProductlD=20571

(enter address to access information) (last visited Apr. 15, 2008)).
162. AT&T, Messaging & Data, supra note 2.
163. AT&T,

Blackberry

Personal,

http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/

services/serviceDetails.jsp?LOSGld=7123100619&skuld=sku 1160046&catld=cat 1510007&
_requestid=27109 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).

164. Id.
165. Id.
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prohibit the166use of P2P file sharing for "intranet access" and "intranet
browsing."

The FTC has concluded that "[t]he law is violated if the first contact...
is secured by deception... even though the true facts are made known to
the buyer before he enters into the contract of purchase."' 167 "[E]ach
representation must stand on its own merit, even if other representations
contain accurate, non-deceptive information."' 168 Thus, material limits on
service, even if fully disclosed in a separate document, may not be
sufficient to correct a misrepresentation.
Professor Tim Wu illustrated similar disclosure issues for wireless
Internet services in his article arguing that consumers should be able to
attach the devices and access the content of their choice on wireless
networks. 169 Professor Wu noted that Verizon's ad offered "unlimited
broadband access" for $59.99 a month with a "2-yr customer agreement and
qualifying voice plan" and a link to "Learn More," but elsewhere in the user
agreement, forbade the use of certain applications such as P2P and VoIP,
and imposed undisclosed data bandwidth use limits.

170

The failure to list

these limits on the face of the screen offering "unlimited broadband access"
and the lack of prominent information about the limits in the customer
agreement indicate those advertisements would not meet the FTC Act's
1 71

standard.

Robert Hahn, Robert Litan, and Hal Singer cite Verizon's abandonment
of the term "unlimited bandwidth" in its advertisements after consumer
complaints about the undisclosed limits to illustrate their argument that
"imposing an additional layer of regulation for mandatory disclosures" is
unnecessary. 172 After those complaints, Verizon included explicit
166. See id. An "Intranet" is a private network using Internet technology for the exclusive
use of those given access to it though the organization that runs the Intranet.

BusinessDictionary.com, intranet, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/intranet.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009). AT&T's terms limit P2P access for "Intranet" use, although most
popular P2P applications are found on the public "Internet." See, e.g., Pando, Featured
Pando
Channel,
National
Geographic
Video
Shorts,
http://www.pando.com/
channellngvideoshorts (last visited Oct. 3, 2009); Vuze, Find, Download, Play,

http://www.vuze.com/app (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). By its express terms, AT&T's
description of permissible and prohibited uses does not disallow P2P "Internet" use, except
through its open-ended limitations allowing AT&T to "deny, disconnect, modify and/or
terminate Service, without notice, to anyone it believes is using the Service in any manner
prohibited or whose usage adversely impacts its wireless networks or service levels." AT&T
Blackberry Personal, supra note 163.
167. FTC v. Med. Billers Network, 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting
Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1961)).

168. Med. Billers Network, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (quoting FTC v. Gill, 71 F. Supp. 2d
1030, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1999)).
169. Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. CoMM. 389, 417 (2007),
http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/152/96.

170. Id. at 405-06.
171. See FTC DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 118, at 1 (noting that the FTC evaluates
the placement of the disclosure in an ad and its proximity to the relevant claim).
172. Robert W. Hahn et al., The Economics of "Wireless Net Neutrality," 3 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 399, 445 (2007).
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statements about data bandwidth limits for wireless Internet users. 173 The
subsequent addition of material limits on existing customers does not,
however, cure inadequate disclosure at the time of purchase, and may also
174
constitute an "unfair" practice under the FTC Act.
Verizon was also pushed into changing its practices by the New York
Attorney General's investigation of Verizon's advertisement of "unlimited"
minutes for wireless data. Verizon's Internet, television, print, direct mail
advertisements,
displays, and brochures described its Data Access Plan as
"unlimited." 175 Yet, Verizon imposed an Internet usage cap on subscribers
its contract terms did not disclose, and prohibited the use of Internet
activities such as movie downloads and online games. 176 The New York
Attorney General's Office commented these "usage restrictions were not
clearly and conspicuously disclosed to consumers and directly contradicted
the promise of 'unlimited' service." 177 Thus, regulation via enforcement of
state laws, not just market forces and industry response to consumer
complaints, changed Verizon's practices.
In October 2007, Verizon entered into an "Assurance of Discontinuance"
with the New York Attorney General's Office not to use the word
"unlimited" to describe or advertise its plan if usage is subject to a
quantitative cap, and to clearly disclose limits for common Internet
applications. 178 The agreement exempted several uses as not "common
internet applications" including "peer to peer (P2P) file sharing applications
that are of such a nature as to lead to unreasonable broadcast to multiple
179
servers," along with other items such as server devices.
The characterization of P2P as an Internet application that was not
common is not reflective of Internet usage in the years before or since the
consent decree. Software company PeerApp noted that "P2P applications
and their ability to access all forms of digital media is the leading reason
why Internet users are flocking towards high speed broadband
173. See id.
174. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1367 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (holding

that a unilateral attempt to modify a contract and impose those changes on existing
customers is an unfair practice under the FTC Act); see also FTC BROADBAND REPORT,
supra note 9, at 130 (citing CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. C-4168 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/caselist/0523148/0523148CardSystemdo.pd.

A full examination of the application of the FTC Act's unfair practices jurisdiction is beyond
the ambit of this Article but merits scholarly attention.
175. VERIZON ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE, supra note 2, para. 3.
176. Id. para. 4. The New York Attorney General also found that Verizon capped users'
"unlimited" wireless through specific usage thresholds that it did not clearly and
conspicuously disclose to consumers, and terminated subscribers exceeding those
undisclosed levels. Id. paras. 7-8.
177. Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen. of N.Y. State, Verizon Wireless Agrees To
Settle Deceptive Marketing Investigation: "Unlimited" Internet Plans Were Actually
Limited, Company Agrees To Change Practices and Reimburse Customer (Oct. 23, 2007),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/oct/oct23a_07.html;
see
ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE, supra note 2, para. 6.
178. VERIZON ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE, supra note 2, para. 13.
179. Id. para. 15.
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networks."' 80 ISP attempts to characterize P2P as a marginal application
that users should know is excluded by "unlimited" plans are increasingly
out of step with the expansion of legal usage of P2P to display video on the
Internet with the permission of the copyright owner, to enable voice calls
through programs such as Skype, or to watch the March Madness basketball
18 1
tournament through platforms like Akami.
In an attempt to justify its actions that limited P2P use, Comcast
contended that its disclaimers "always properly and clearly informed its
customers of the nature of its High-Speed Internet service and of the
company's need to manage its network."' 182 Comcast informed the FCC
that for years its Acceptable User Policy (AUP) required customers to
ensure that their "use of the Service does not restrict, inhibit, interfere with,
or degrade any other user's use of the Service nor represent ... an overly
large burden on the network."' 183 Comcast emphasized that its Terms of
Service were subject to "upstream and downstream rate limitations," but did
not specify the boundaries of those limits. 184 From a user's perspective, it
is difficult to determine whether their use of any protocol will impose an
overly large burden on the network or exceed unspecified upstream and
downstream rate limitations.
Comcast, along with several parties who filed comments in the FCC
broadband practices proceeding, alleged that P2P protocols use large
amounts of bandwidth, burdening the network and causing congestion. 185
This occurs in part because P2P users send more data upstream than most
ISPs anticipated. 86 Comcast allocates less upstream capacity to Internet
users than downstream capacity, assuming users will download more files

180. Transit Link Growth, supra note 28.
181. ACCELERATING THE VIDEO INTERNET, supra note 20, at 4-6 (observing that with the

use of video on the Internet "extreme users are becoming the norm."). For example, Akami
sustained 286,000 simultaneous live P2P streams for basketball games during the 2006
March Madness college tournament. Id.
182. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 39.
183. Id. at 40 (citing Comcast Corp., Network Management and Limitations on
Bandwidth Consumption, http://www.comcast.net/terms/use).
184. Id. at 40.
185. Reply Comments of Comcast Corp. at 9 n.14, Broadband Indus. Practices, No. 07-52
(Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Reply Comments] ("'[P2P]
applications significantly alter the traditional traffic flow of a network by massively
increasing the quantity and duration of traffic from the end user. This traffic, multiplied
across multiple end users, can and does exceed the capacity of the network if not managed in
some fashion."' (quoting Amplex Electric, Comments at 1-2, FCC File No. EB-08-IH-1518,
WC Docket No. 07-52 (2007))); Comments of AT&T Inc. at 12-21, Broadway Indus.
Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n 2007) [hereinafter AT&T
Comments] (P2P presents challenges including congestion, unpredictability and inefficient
use of bandwidth).
186. Comcast Reply Comments, supra note 185, at 10 n.20 ("'P2P technologies invert a
key engineering assumption about the direction of traffic flows on the Internet ... thus
placing a much greater strain on upstream bandwidth than network engineers anticipated."'
(omission in original) (quoting AT&T Comments, supra note 185, at 12-13)).
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than they upload. 187 The Consumer Federation of America and Free Press
heralded this as a positive feature that breaks the closed network model of
some ISPs. 188 Comcast lambasted this same feature as degrading other
89
users' Internet experience. 1
Sandvine, the maker of the software Comcast deployed to limit P2P use,
pointed out that a number of factors contribute to congestion, including
ISPs' "longstanding policy of overbooking networks" and a network
190
"design philosophy that no longer reflects current bandwidth usage."'
Sandvine commented,
DSL, cable and wireless networks are all hampered by a design
philosophy that no longer reflects current bandwidth usage. The
asymmetrical design of these networks, which dictates that downstream
traffic is faster than upstream traffic, was originally based on usage
patterns from early content-consuming applications like e-mail and Webbrowsing. However, the continual evolution of applications from content
consuming to always-on content supplying has meant that 19
current
traffic
1
patterns no longer fit asymmetrical bandwidth assumptions.

ISP network bandwidth has traditionally been divided to provide more
capacity for downstream uses (downloading) than upstream uses (sending).
That network design reified the paradigm of Internet users as content
consumers, rather than content creators or people who share content. P2P
challenges those assumptions by facilitating the publication and sharing of
content, although it is also used to transmit voice and video data to content
consumers.
As Comcast's comments indicate, its network design
contributed to network congestion as Internet applications evolved to
facilitate more user-generated data, as well as browsing, downloading, and
uploading larger data files.
The shared nature of cable-based Internet access also results in
congestion, especially during peak periods, when multiple users in a
neighborhood try to access the Internet. 19 2 Since the network is shared,
users cannot predict when and what other subscribers will use. Nor are they
privy to the ISPs' network design or congestion-management practices to
allow the subscriber to anticipate how much upstream or downstream
capacity they can use.

187. Letter from Comcast to the FCC (Sept. 25, 2008), at 2-3 [hereinafter Sept. 25, 2008

Comcast Letter]. Comcast contends that in some locations P2P use accounts for two-thirds
of all uploads through the network. Id. at 11.
188. Comments of Consumer Federation of America, et al., BroadbandIndus. Practices,
WC Docket No. 07-52, at 5-6 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n 2007).
189. See Comcast Reply Comments, supra note 185, at 10.
190. TRAFFIC OPTIMIZATION, supra note 27, at 1-2.
191. Id. at 1.

192. See Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 11; Yoo, supra note 29, at 201 ("Unlike
under DSL, traffic generated by individual cable modem customers shares bandwidth with
the traffic generated by their neighbors from the moment it leaves their house."
Consequently, a cable modem customer's quality of service "is considerably more sensitive
to the bandwidth consumption of their immediate neighbors.").
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Additionally, some users may be unaware that the applications they are
requesting use P2P. Many consumers may not realize that some VolP
services use P2P to make voice or video calls over the Internet. 193
Consumers may unwittingly violate ISP interpretation of their terms of
service by using applications they would not readily identify as P2P-based
technologies.
Comcast's disclaimers, terms, or policies did not reveal that deep-packet
inspection software scoured a user's Internet traffic. Nor did Comcast
reveal to its users or the market (until the FCC required it to do so) that the
company had identified certain Internet protocols for "management,"
triggering Comcast's disruption of those applications when undisclosed
usage levels were reached. 194 Pursuant to the FCC's August 2008 order that
Comcast disclose its congestion management procedures, Comcast revealed
that "[w]hen the number of unidirectional upload sessions for any of the
managed P2P protocols for a particular Sandvine PTS [Policy Traffic
Switch] reaches the pre-determined session threshold, the Sandvine PTS
issues instructions called 'reset packets' that delay unidirectional uploads
for that particular P2P protocol in the geographical area managed by that
Sandvine PTS."' 9 5
Comcast had not previously disclosed that such
interruptions would occur when an undisclosed level of traffic involving
any protocols was reached.
Comcast contended that it advised its
customers about its right to engage in "reasonable network
management."' 196 Subscribers and Internet application developers could
hardly have anticipated Comcast's conduct under an ISP's reservation of
"reasonable network management." Comcast's open-ended reservations
provided inadequate disclosure to alert subscribers to the limits on the
unfettered Internet access they were promised.
2. Were Comcast's Actions Deceptive in Light of Its Promised Services
and Limited Disclosures?
In response to the FCC's order to reveal Comcast's network management
practices, Comcast revealed in September 2008 that it used Sandvine to
examine the headers of TCP/IP packets to distinguish whether traffic is
VoIP, P2P, or e-mail.' 9 7 The Associated Press contended that Comcast
193. See Skype, P2P Telephony Explained, http://www.skype.com/help/guides/p2pexplained/
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (Skype was founded to develop the first P2P telephony network);
Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 33, at 407 n.82 (characterizing Skype as having
moderate bandwidth requirements since it uses 3-16 kilobytes per second depending on
available bandwidth while on a call and 0-0.5 kilobytes per second while idle). The FCC
defines broadband as speeds that exceed 200 kilobits per second). INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH.
BUREAU, FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICE FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2008 n.1
(2009)

[hereinafter FCC 2008 HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ACCESS REPORT),

available at

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-292191 A 1.doc.
194. See Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, attachment A, at 8-9.
195. Id. at 10.
196. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 39-42.
197. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, attachment A, at 7.
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used Sandvine to inject "reset" messages to block its attempts to access the
King James Bible from other P2P users. 198 Through reset messages,
"[e]ach PC gets a message invisible to the user that looks like it comes from
the other computer, telling it to stop communicating. But neither message
originated from the other computer-it comes from Comcast."' 99 Sandvine
advertised secrecy as a feature of its product so that "subscribers have no
20 0
indication of what is happening."
A reset (RST) message was defined in the document describing TCP/IP
protocol submitted in 1981 to the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency to mean "[r]eset the connection." 20 1 An October 1989 document
that was an official specification for the Internet community states that "[a]
reset message notifies the sender computer that a port it is trying to reach is
unreachable."

20 2

Dr. Sally Floyd criticized the use of resets as a congestion management
tool in a 2002 Internet Engineering Task Force memo. 20 3 Offering her
interpretation of the original specification of TCP, Floyd observed that
"Resets are appropriately sent in response to a connection request to a
nonexistent connection, for example. The TCP receiver of the reset aborts
the TCP connection, and notifies the application. .".." 204 Floyd stated that
using resets for congestion management confuses their meaning and
205
encourages aggressive countermeasures.
Dr. Floyd's comments rebuked ISPs and Internet firewall administrators
who were increasingly deploying resets. In 2004, a team of Spanish
researchers published an article suggesting that resets could be used
effectively to mitigate bandwidth use of P2P software, exactly the practice
Comcast adopted. 20 6 Other ISPs triggered resets to create "firewalls"
against unwanted intrusions or to limit Internet access including bandwidth

198. Peter Svensson, How the AP Tested Comcast's File-SharingFilter, Oct. 18, 2007,
ASSOCIATED PRESS,

available at http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2007/10/19/1035713-ap-

tests-comcasts-file-sharing-filter; see also Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet

Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2007 [hereinafter Svensson, Comcast Blocking],
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/.
199. Svensson, Comcast Blocking, supra note 198.

200. SANDVtNE INC., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF TODAY'S EVASIVE P2P TRAFFIC 14
(2004), availableat http://www.larryblakeley.com/Articles/p2p/Evasive_P2P Traffic.pdf. It

is noteworthy that this author was able to find Sandvine's white paper through Sandvine's
website in July 2008. In February 2009, although portions of Sandvine's website showed the
paper's title, the link to that paper was disabled.
201. RFC 793, supra note 61, at 16.
202. INTERNET ENG'G TASK FORCE,
COMMUNICATIONS LAYERS

RFC 112, REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNET HOSTS-

(R. Braden ed., 1989), http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfcl122.html/

(serving as an official specification for the Internet community that discusses the
requirements for Internet host software).
203. Sally Floyd, Internet Eng'g Task Force, Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered
Harmful, May 2002, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-floyd-tcp-reset-04 (internet draft).
204. Id. at 1-2.

205. Id. at 4.
206. A.M. Guirado-Puerta et al., Peer-to-Peer Traffic Measurement, Analysis and
Management in an InstitutionalNetwork, COMM., INTERNET & INFO. TECH. 174 (2004).
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consumption during "wait time" when certain protocols are inactive. 20 7

China famously uses resets to deter users of Chinese Internet services from
accessing information the government deems undesirable. 20 8 One Internet
expert published a paper warning that hackers may exploit resets to initiate
a denial-of-service attack to falsely terminate an established TCP
9
connection.

20

Vuze, a company that uses P2P to distribute legal video and other
content, developed a "plug-in" to allow Internet users around the world to
monitor and gather data on Internet resets they encountered. 2 10 Over 8000
2 11
users participated, involving more than one million hours of Internet use.
Vuze's study identified Comcast along with Cogeco, a Canadian ISP, as
2 12
having high Internet reset rates.
A 2008 study by the German Max Planck Institute found that 82 of the
151 Cox broadband subscribers (54%) that voluntarily tested their
connections through the research group's site had their P2P connections
blocked. 2 13 Of the 788 Comcast subscribers participating, 491 (62%) were
blocked. 2 14 The Max Planck Institute reported that evidence of blocking
BitTorrent connections, a popular application using P2P, declined since
April 2008, the month in which the FCC held its second hearing about
broadband network management practices.2 15
Evidence of blocking
declined throughout the summer of 2008, although for Comcast it did not
drop precipitously until November 2008, several months after the FCC's
2 16
August 2008 reprimand of Comcast's practices.
207. Martin Arlitt & Carey Williamson, An Analysis of TCP Reset Behaviour on the
Internet, COMPUTER COMM. REV., Jan. 2005, at 37, 37-44 (2004).

208. James Fallows, The Connection Has Been Reset, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 2008, at 64,
64-69.
209. See PAUL WATSON, SLIPPING IN THE WINDOw: TCP RESET ATTACKS (2003),
available at http://osvdb/ref/04/04030-SlippinglnTheWindow_v .O.doc; Paul Roberts,
Experts Warn of TCP Vulnerability: Network Infrastructure Providers and Companies'

Internal Networks Called the Most Vulnerable to DOS Attacks, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 21,
2004, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9253 I/Experts warn of TCP vulnerability.
210. Vuze, First Results from Vuze Network Monitoring Tool 1 (Apr. 18, 2008),
http://cache2.vuze.com/docs/internet future/FirstResultsfromVuzeNetworkMonitoring
_Tool.pdf.

211. Id.
212. Id. at 2. Cogeco Cable Inc. offers high speed Internet service in Canada. Cogeco's
High Speed Internet in Ontario Gets a Boost, Yahoo! Canada Finance (Aug. 4, 2009),
http://ca.news.finance.yahoo.com/s/04082009/28/link-f-ccnmatthews-cogeco-s-high-speedinternet-ontario-gets-boost.html.
213. Nate Anderson, Cox, Comcast Biggest BitTorrent Blockers in the World, ARS
TECHNICA,
May 15, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/05/us-isps-biggestbittorrent-blockers-in-the-world.ars; see also Marcel Dischinger et al., DETECTING
BITTORRENT BLOCKING, ACM INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE (2008), available at

http://broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results/08 imc blocking.pdf,
Max
Planck
Institute for Software Systems, Glasnost: Results from Tests for BitTorrent Traffic
Blocking, http://broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter Glasnost Traffic Blocking Tests].
214. Anderson, supra note 213.
215. See Glasnost Traffic Blocking Tests, supra note 213, § 5.
216. See id.
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AT&T criticized Vuze's study in its comments filed with the FCC,
arguing that the study only pointed out that resets occurred, but did not
demonstrate that ISPs were using resets for network management. 2 17 While
not proof of an ISP's motives or methods, this evidence of high levels of
resets for users of certain ISPs substantiated the call for investigation into
Internet traffic management techniques, including resets. Comcast's
September 2008 admission to the FCC that it used resets for traffic
management and specifically targeted P2P validates the trends revealed in
2 18
the Vuze and Max Planck studies.
Comcast contended that its "practices are widely accepted in engineering
circles as constituting reasonable network management, '2 19 a claim that
provoked great controversy. Dr. David Reed commented at the FCC's en
banc hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices that "neither
Deep Packet Inspection nor RST [reset] Injection are acceptable behavior
by autonomous systems in the Internet ...they violate the expectation that
the contents of the envelopes are untouched inside and between
autonomous systems." 220 Reed cited Floyd's RFC, discussed above, as
evidence that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the body that
determines Internet protocols, rejects resets as good design for controlling
22
congestion. 1
In September 2008, as Comcast disclosed its network management
practices to the FCC, Richard Bennett, an Internet Network Architect,
defended the use of resets as a congestion management tool. 222 Bennett
cited Paul Korzeniowski's article for Forbes, which emphasized the need
for ISPs to manage network congestion in light of their overselling of
bandwidth capacity. 223 Korzeniowski noted that the Public Switched
Telephone Network would respond to congestion by providing users a busy
signal and lamented that the Internet's architecture does not give ISPs a
busy signal.22 4 Bennett commented, "ISP's actually do have a 'busy signal
option:' it's the Reset packet that Comcast uses to limit active upstream
217. Letter from Jack Zinman, Gen. Att'y, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC,
WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Apr. 25, 2008). AT&T also highlighted
the need for ISPs and Internet application developers to work together to make Internet use
more efficient and encouraged Vuze to collaborate with industry organizations to discuss
network management issues. Id.
218. See Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, at 7.
219. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 4. The comments also describe the network
management practices of other broadband providers. Id. at 21-22.
220. Dr. David P. Reed, Adjunct Professor, MIT Media Lab., Opening Statement at MIT
Communication
Futures
Program
(Feb.
25,
2008),
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/broadbandnetwork-management/022508/reed.pdf.
221. Id. (citing Floyd, supra note 203). See generally Internet Eng'g Task Force,
http://www.ietf.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
222. Richard Bennett, Comcast Is Right, the FCC Is Wrong, CIRCLE ID, Sept. 28, 2008,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/2008928_comcast-right-fcc-wrong/.
223. Paul Korzeniowski, Feds and Internet Service Providers Don't Mix, FORBES.COM,

Sept.
26,
2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/26/net-neutrality-comcast-ent-techcx_pk 0926bmightynetneutrality.html.
224. Id.
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sessions." 225 I argue that using resets as a "busy signal" is deceptive in that
it makes the user believe the problem is with the application or the site she
is trying to reach when the problem is with the network. The telephone
system employs a "hard" or "fast" busy signal to indicate a network
problem, a distinction resets upend.
Using resets to reduce network congestion muddies the significance of
their established meaning.
Comcast admitted to using deep-packet
inspection to identify certain P2P applications through a code in their TCP
header and trip the reset message to delay that transmission. 226 The
documents that established the protocol for "resets" did not contemplate its
use for this purpose and assigned a different significance to that message.
Comcast effectively asks users and competitors to accept a world behind
227
the "Looking Glass," where meaning may change at the ISP's discretion
and the ISP effectively controls what may be carried through its access to
the Internet. Although the designers of the Internet contemplated that it
would be dynamic, they did not contemplate that those who controlled
access to the Internet's physical layer would discriminate against certain
types or sources of traffic in light of prevailing common-carrier regulations
228
for the telephone network that carried the Internet.
Comcast used the "reset" function of TCP/IP to delay at least some P2P
traffic on the grounds that P2P caused undue congestion for Comcast
customers trying to access the Internet. 2 29 Comcast contended that a reset
packet is "the only machine language [P2P protocols] understand [and] this
type of technique is common in the networking and software industry where
alternatives don't exist. '2 30 Yet, TCP itself is designed to handle Internet
congestion. When faced with Internet congestion, TCP will activate
messages other than resets telling senders to slow down their transmission
rates. 23 1 Resets were designed to indicate that a connection port an Internet
user is trying to reach is unreachable, 232 not to signal or handle Internet

225. Bennett, supra note 222.
226. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 28 (admitting that Comcast uses TCP reset
messages to delay initiation of new P2P uploads).
227. See CARROLL, supra note 1, at 106 ("'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said...
'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."').
228. See supra Part 11.
229. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 28; Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note
187, at 2 (contending Comcast only delayed attempts to upload P2P packets in times of

network congestion).
230. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 28 (quoting George Ou, EFF Wants to Saddle
You with Metered Internet Service, ZDNET, REAL WORLD IT, Dec. 2007,
http:/iblogs.zdnet.comiOu?p=914&page=3 (contending that mechanisms do not exist to
substitute for the use of TCP reset messages to manage excessive traffic)).
231. Reply Comments of Free Press, et al. at 25, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Free Press Reply Comments] (citing Reed, supra note
220).

232. See INTERNET ENG'G TASK FORCE, supra note 202.
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congestion. Other applications or services can also alleviate Internet
congestion, 2 33 indicating that resets are not an ISP's only alternative.
Comcast characterized its use of reset messages benignly. Comcast
informed the FCC that to "effectuate its management practices, Comcast's
network issues instructions called 'reset packets'-which involve a
communication between two IP addresses (and, importantly, not between
two people)-to temporarily delay the initiation of new unidirectional P2P
file uploads." 23 4 Comcast contended that it inserted a reset in the TCP/IP
packet header only to delay the upload:
A "reset" is nothing more than a bit in the TCP packet header that is used
to signal that there is an error condition within the network and that a new
connection needs to be established; the new connection is automatically
established by the application or service initiating the connection. It is
much like what occurs when a fax machine receives a busy signal and the
machine automatically redials until the facsimile goes through, except that
in the case of P2P the downloading computer may have hundreds or
thousands of other computers to look to for the desired file.... This is the
same message that the computer receives when any number of problems
occur during a P2P file transfer, and the computer requesting the file
automatically knows how to process this message and to retry its request
(assuming it has not already downloaded the file from
other computers)
235
without the user having to take any additional action.
Comcast contented that when "P2P unidirectional upload sessions (i.e.
sessions where a computer is only uploading and not simultaneously
uploading and downloading) reach a pre-determined congestion threshold
in a particular neighborhood, Comcast temporarily delays initiation of any
new unidirectional upload sessions until the number of active uploading
'236
sessions drops below that threshold.

233. Free Press Reply Comments, supra note 231, at 25-26 (noting Random Early Drops
"signal[] congestion to the ends by dropping packets randomly," which the ends can send
more slowly, while Early Congestion Notification "mark[s] 'envelopes' passing through
congested areas so the end points can decide to slow traffic"). P2P "caching services"
manage network congestion by "caching popular files" to relieve upload bandwidth while
providing consumers with access to services and services with access to consumers. Id. at 26
(citing PEERAPP, PEERAPP WHITE PAPER: COMPARING P2P SOLUTIONS (2007), available at
http://peerapp.com/Data/Files/ComparingP2Psolutions.pdf) ("P2P caching, similar to Web
caching, temporarily stores popular content flowing into the ISP network. If the content
requested by a subscriber is available from a cache, cache satisfies the request from its
temporary storage, eliminating data transfer through expensive transit line. With estimates
of over 75% of P2P content is requested multiple times, P2P content responds well to
caching, manifesting high reuse patterns.")).
234. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 28. Comcast's emphasis on the lack of
communication between two people involved in resets is curious because regardless of
whether the message is inserted by a program Comcast employs or by a "person"
communicating with another person, that distinction would not be significant to the analysis
of the FTC Act's proscriptions against unfair or deceptive acts or practices or the FCC's
analysis of these practices under the Communications Act.
235. Id. at 28-29.
236. Id. at 27.
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Comcast's analogy to a busy fax machine is inaccurate. The alleged
problem is not that the other "number is busy" in the sense that the other
computer or site the user is trying to reach is unavailable, but that
Free Press, the organization that
Comcast's network is congested.
petitioned the FCC to investigate Comcast's practices, 23 7 contended that
resets effectively stop transmissions. 238 Free Press avers that while some
software automatically tries again to establish an Internet connection when
faced with a reset message, this is not true of all programs that
communicate using protocols blocked by Comcast's reset messages. 239 For
applications that do not keep trying to connect, a reset message effectively
terminates rather than delays an attempt to connect to an Internet site or
another computer using the Internet in the face of a reset message.
Similarly, Comcast's analogy to "a traffic ramp control light [that]
regulates the entry of additional vehicles onto a freeway during rush hour"
is inapposite, in that the traffic signal makes it clear to the freeway driver
240
that conditions such as rush hour require management of driver entry.
Drivers know to expect delays during rush hour and can potentially avoid
these delays by choosing to travel at other times or on other routes. The
reset message does not communicate to the computer or its user that the
network is congested. Nor did Comcast's undisclosed rules for using reset
messages (or its protocol-agnostic congestion management system adopted
in 2009 to delay the traffic of Internet users who contribute to
congestion) 24 1 inform a user about times when congestion and congestion
management protocols are more or less likely to be deployed.
Information about congestion problems, network management practices,
and restrictions on the use of certain Internet applications might lead a user
to subscribe to a different ISP that uses a service such as DSL that does not
require subscribers to share bandwidth. 242 As Comcast explained, for
cable-based broadband, "bandwidth available for high-speed cable Internet
service is not individually dedicated, but is shared among multiple users,
and one household's use of the service necessarily impacts use of the
service by other users in that geographic area." 243 The shared bandwidth of
237. Formal Complaint, Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corp., WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Nov. 1, 2007).
238. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling at 12, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Nov. 1, 2007).
239. Id. at 13-14.
240. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 29.
241. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, at 15; see Glasnost Traffic Blocking
Tests, supra note 213, § 4 (stating that the percentage of blocked tests attempting to use
BitTorrent on Comcast remained "high at all times of the day" and every day of the week,
suggesting that "BitTorrent blocking is independent of the time of the day").
242. AT&T, which provides broadband Internet through its telephone network, stated in a
filing to the FCC that it "does not use 'false reset messages' to manage its network."
Zinman, supra note 217.
243. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 11. Free Press notes that Comcast allocates
hundreds of channels of bandwidth to its video service and video on demand and only two or
three channels to broadband. Free Press Reply Comments, supra note 231, at 23. Free Press
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cable-modem-based Internet access contributes to congestion.
Reset
messages, as well as Internet packet slowdown techniques, deflect
subscriber attention to network design as a source of congestion and make it
appear that the problem is with the Internet site or protocol the subscriber is
trying to use.
In the parlance of the telephone network, Comcast's reset message
effectively says, "The number you have reached is not in service. Please
check the number and try again." Yet, the real problem is congestion,
caused not only by user demand for particular applications, but also by the
ISP's own network architecture and bandwidth limitations. It would be
more accurate to inform consumers as the telephone system does, "All
circuits are busy now, please try your call again later." The "all circuits are
busy" message communicates that the problem is with the network. It also
communicates that the network is unable to process current levels of
demand.
Failure to disclose Internet practices that may track or interfere with
computer use may be deceptive under the FTC Act. The FTC brought a
complaint in 2007 against an Internet advertising software provider for
failure to disclose that its offers of free software programs ("lureware")
such as screen savers, games, and P2P software would also result in the
installation of defendant Zango's adware, designed to monitor Internet use
and deliver ads based on individual use patterns. 244 The FTC bought a
similar complaint against Advertising.Com and issued an order requiring
better disclosure of what consumers were getting. 24 5 While Comcast and
other ISPs may argue that reservation of rights to manage the network
permitted the use of resets and other techniques, material interference with
the use of Internet applications indicates that under the Zango and
Advertising.Com precedent, such tactics should have been explicitly
disclosed. The ability of resets to thwart or slow use of applications and
deflect blame for their apparent malfunction indicates that failure to
disclose resets or similar tactics is a material deception.
Faced with a deceptive message that the Internet content of their choice is
"disconnected" and that the user must try again, some users might conclude
that the Internet is not a viable means to access legal data including video,
voice, games, or other services. These are exactly the services that ISPs,
contends that if cable companies implemented switched digital video (SDV) technology,
only channels requested by customers would be sent through the last mile to the customer's
home, saving considerable bandwidth. Id. Time Warner's Chief Technology Officer
reported that using SVD yielded more than 50% of bandwidth savings. Mike Robuck, Switch
Is on for Cox, Time Warner Cable, CT REPORTS, Apr.
13, 2006,
http://www.cable360.net/ct/news/ctreports/18481.html. This highlights the role of the ISP's
choices in network congestion and undermines any contention that resets are the only
technical means to deal with such congestion.
244. See Complaint at 2, Zango Inc., No. C-4186, 2007 WL 809634 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Mar. 7, 2007).
245. Advertising.Com, 140 F.T.C. 220 (2005) (holding that failure to disclose material
fact that software touted as Internet security program contained adware was a deceptive
practice under the FTC Act).
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such as Comcast, provide through their vertically and horizontally
integrated affiliates. The FTC expressed concern in its 2007 Broadband
Connectivity and Competition Policy Report that "in many instances it may
be more difficult for an end user to distinguish between performance
problems resulting from deliberate discrimination and problems resulting
246
from other, more general causes."
If users knew that Comcast inserted those reset messages, consumer
dissatisfaction about Comcast's actions and network congestion might
threaten the incumbent's revenues and market share. Yet, subscribers have
limited market choices if dissatisfied with such practices. Comcast might
respond to disaffected subscribers who cancel their minimum-term contract
(often required for those who buy video, voice, and Internet bundles), based
on Comcast's actions, by charging an "early termination fee," effectively
penalizing a subscriber for the ISP's previously undisclosed practices and
247
discouraging switching.
Vuze, a company that uses P2P software to legally distribute video,
music, and games over the Internet, 248 contended that Comcast's
slowing or degrading of traffic causes users of applications such as Vuze
to lose patience and abandon using the application-particularly if they
do not realize that the network operator is causing the delay and instead
mistakenly think
that the delay is caused by the content delivery platform
24 9
(like Vuze).
The effect of an ISP's representations on Internet application developers
raises the question of whether they can seek redress under the deceptive
conduct proscriptions of the FTC Act.
The FTC Act statute does not use the word "consumer" to describe the
reach of its prohibitions against deceptive trade practices. Nonetheless, the
deceptive practices portion of the FTC Act is often characterized as a
''consumer protection" provision because the standard tests whether a
material representation is false or likely to mislead a customer acting
reasonably under the circumstances. 2 50 Although Internet application
providers are not subscribers who pay ISPs for the service of providing
Internet access, they are arguably consumers who use some of the Internet

246. FTC BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 33.

247. Analysis of the enforceability of early termination fees is beyond the scope of this
Article, but such fees highlight the barriers facing a subscriber who wants to mitigate the
harms of deceptive practices by canceling the contract and switching to another ISP that did
not impose similar limits or use such methods, even if one were available.
248. See Vuze, About Vuze, http://www.vuze.com/corp/Technology.html
Oct. 3, 2009).

(last visited

249. Comments of Vuze, Inc. at 3, Broadband Indus. Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52
(Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Feb. 13, 2007).
250. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 (1984); see also Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n
v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 75-1613, at 3 (1937)

(stating that the FTC Act amendments were designed to prevent injury to the consumer as
well as practices that are unfair to competitors)).
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access the ISP provides through the applications and content carried
through the ISP's conduit.
Professor Yoo observed that the Internet is a "[t]wo-sided market[]" that
arises "when network economic effects create demand interdependencies
that cause the value that any one party derives from participating in the
platform to depend not only on price, but also on the number of other
platform participants." 25 1 In other words, the value of the Internet is
increased by those offering applications or sharing content through
applications such as P2P. Professors Joseph Farrell and Professor Weiser
recognized that when ISPs are faced with the growing popularity of
applications that threaten their traditional revenue sources, their incentives
to interfere with those applications may outweigh their incentives to deliver
the broadest range of Internet access. 252 In this two-sided market,
application providers, as well as ISP subscribers, are affected by an ISP's
network management practices that limit or narrow access to certain
protocols.
Vuze requested that the FCC examine whether Comcast's actions
constituted "reasonable network management. '2 53 In August 2008, the
FCC found that Comcast's interference with P2P and other types of Internet
packets violated the Communications Act of 1934, the 1996 Act, and FCC
Internet policy. 2 54 The FCC expressed concern about Comcast's motives in
light of the video files that consumers were trying to access through P2P
that could pose a competitive threat to Comcast's video services and create
2 55
competition and pressure on prices for such service.
Technological developments and the economic recession have made that
competitive pressure grow. As the economy soured in late 2008 and 2009,
some households cut the cable or satellite cord and turned to the Internet to
watch video in order to save money. 256 An ISP's ability to limit use of
Internet applications or bandwidth tempers consumer ability to substitute
the Internet for cable or satellite video services.
Before ISP interference with certain Internet protocols was revealed,
Internet application developers used the standard TCP/IP code, which
257
included numbers in the TCP header to identify the Internet application,
understanding that the reset function would be used only when there was a
problem with the source or site to which the user was trying to connect.
251. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 29, at 222-23.

252. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 33, at 101, 105 (explaining that incentives to
undermine an application that can compete with the ISP's core platform are an exception to
the principle that ISPs will tend to "internalize complementary efficiencies").
253. Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by Broadband
Network Operators at 1, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Nov. 14, 2007).
254. FCC Comcast Order,supra note 3, at 13,028-34.
255. Id. at 13,030, 13,036-37; see also Farrell & Weiser, supra note 33, at 101.
256. Worley, supra note 34.
257. Comcast Reply Comments, supra note 185, at 26-28. Sandvine examines the
relevant header information in the packet that indicates what type of protocol is being used
(e.g., P2P, VoIP). Id.
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Those programmers now realize they built a shutoff valve into their
software that ISPs argue they can trigger to "manage congestion." 258 As an
alternative to avoid Comcast's tactics, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
suggested software developers encrypt their files to "prevent[] ISP
intermediaries from telling which protocol a particular connection is using"
so the ISP "cannot directly discriminate based on protocol. '2 59 Deeppacket wars are developing on the Internet.
Professor Jonathan Zittrain suggested that "[i]f network providers try to
be more constraining about what traffic they allow on their networks,
software can and will be written to evade such restrictions-so long as
generative PCs remain common on which to install that software. '260 He
recognized that "workarounds would be less effective if the network
provider merely slowed down all traffic that was not expressly favored or
authorized," a tactic some ISPs such as Cox are deploying, as discussed
below. 26 1 Professor Zittrain concluded that "in a world of open PCs some
users can more or less help themselves, routing around some blockages that
262
seek to prevent them from doing what they want to do online."
Evasion has not been so easy and, as Professor Zittrain points out, only
"some users" will have the technical savvy to circumvent their ISP's
constraints. 263
While sophisticated users may employ "technical
countermeasures, including end-to-end encryption," Richard Whitt
expressed concern that "a market arms race escalation may be insufficient
264
to deter bad conduct by the broadband providers."
The need to outwit your ISP to access Internet applications not only
deters use of those applications, it highlights the limited nature of their
supposedly "unlimited" or "unfettered" service. Under the FTC Act, the
ability of some sophisticated users or application developers to skirt ISP
limits by hiding the nature of their Internet applications does not constitute
a defense to the ISP's failure to deliver the promised service levels where

258. Id. at 15.
259. PETER ECKERSLEY, FRED VON LOHMANN & SETH SCHOEN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
PACKET FORGERY BY ISPs: A REPORT ON THE COMCAST AFFAIR (2007), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/effcomcast-report2.pdf; see ARBOR NETWORKS, WHITE PAPER:
THE ROLE OF DEEP PACKET INSPECTION IN MOBILE NETWORKS 2, available at
http://telephonyonline.com/whitepapers/forms/wpO109-arborl/
(registration
required)
(explaining that while Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) used to post Web pages
"consistently uses port 80, many Web applications and traffic types use HTTP or
masquerade as HTTP traffic in order to circumvent operator controls. This is the case with
many peer-to-peer (p2p) applications.").
260. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FuTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How To STOP IT 180

(2008). Zittrain defines "generativity" as "a system's capacity to produce unanticipated
change through unfiltered contributionsfrom broadand variedaudiences." Id. at 70.
261. Id. at 181; see infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances To Foster
Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 532 (2009).
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the material constraints on that service were not simultaneously, clearly,
265
and prominently disclosed.
D. FTC Act Deceptive Practices Claim: Alleged Benefits of Conduct Not a
Defense
Comcast defended its Internet management practices as benefiting both
subscribers and those who run applications on the Internet. Comcast
contended that it uses "state-of-the-art technologies that do not prevent or
block consumers from using P2P protocols but do ensure that such uses 2do
66
not degrade other users' access to content, applications, and service."
Comcast informed the FCC of its perception that "a very small number of
broadband users employ certain P2P protocols that utilize immense
amounts of bandwidth in ways that are unpredictable and inconsistent and
that can threaten to overwhelm network capacity and harm the online
experience of other users." 267 Comcast claimed its practices helped
applications that are sensitive to network interference, promoting horizontal
268
competition on the Internet, while improving service for subscribers.
Those professed benefits to subscribers as a whole and certain Internet
applications do not constitute a defense to an FTC Act deception claim.
Comcast's promise of unfettered Internet access was a blanket promise to
each subscriber of that service (and a representation to Internet application
and content developers who rely on ISPs to deliver their content), not a
promise to maximize Internet bandwidth available to the majority of
subscribers. Some subscribers may understand that their Internet access
will be slower when traffic increases on a shared bandwidth system, such as
a cable modem-based ISP, while other subscribers unaware of these
features of cable-based Internet will not. The ISP's promise of unfettered
Internet access does not generate an expectation that certain sites or
protocols will be more difficult or impossible to use during such times or
that the ISP will restrict Internet access.
Unlike the standard for evaluating conduct alleged to be "unfair" under
the FTC Act, which requires a determination that the challenged practice is
not "outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition," 26 9 the FTC Act's deception standards contain no balancing
test for weighing alleged consumer benefits against the harms of a

265. Cf FTC DOT COM DiSCLOSURES, supra note 118, at 1; FTC Policy Statement on
Deception, supra note 113, at 3 (In cases involving omission of material information "the
Commission examines the failure to disclose in light of expectations and understandings of
the typical buyer regarding the claims made.").
266. Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 3-4.
267. Id. at 14.
268. Id. at 17.
269. Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness
Jurisdiction, appended to Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, app. at 1073 (1984)
[hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
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representation that is claimed to be deceptive. 2 70 Though the subscriber
benefits of Internet traffic management techniques are hotly contested, any
such benefits would not shield the ISP from an FTC Act deception claim.
The FTC Act's proscriptions against deceptive acts or practices in
interstate commerce do not require an examination of the service provider's
intent. The FTC examines the effects of the service provider's material
representation(s) on consumers and competition. Intent to deceive is not an
element of the FTC Act's proscriptions against unfair or deceptive conduct,
"but a consumer's reasonable and detrimental reliance is." 2 71 Despite a
company's benign characterization of such practices (a description the FCC
disputed when it found Comcast throttled P2P access at all hours regardless
of the state of congestion), 272 if those practices are not consistent with a
company's promises to consumers and were not prominently disclosed
along with the relevant representations, they may violate the FTC Act.
E. FTC Act Deceptive Practices Claim: PrivateAgreements with
Application Providersand Changes in the Congestion Management System
Do Not Resolve the FTCAct Issues
Comcast announced in July 2008 its agreement with VoIP provider
Vonage to "work together with Vonage to ensure that network management
techniques are chosen that effectively balance the need to avoid network
congestion with the need to ensure that over-the-top VoIP services like
Vonage work well for consumers."273 This agreement generated swift
criticism. Professor Marvin Ammori commented on behalf of Free Press,
"We are baffled as to why it was necessary for Vonage to strike a network
270. FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 297 (D. Mass 2008) ("To
successfully prove a claim under section 5(a), the FTC must establish three elements: (1)
that the advertisement conveyed a representation through either express or implied claims;
(2) that the representation was likely to mislead consumers; and (3) that the misleading
representation was material.").
271. FTC v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing FTC v.
Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also FTC v. Verity
Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006); FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861
F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988) (determining that deception need not be made with intent to
deceive; it is enough that the representations or practices were likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably).
272. FCC Comcast Order, supra note 3, at 13,031-32.
273. Press Release, Vonage, Comcast and Vonage Form Collaboration to Address
Network Management and Better Meet Customer Needs (July 9, 2008),
http://pr.vonage.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=320493. Over-the-top VoIP services use
the Internet to provide voice "calls," as opposed to a dedicated portion of the cable network
or a wireline network. See Letter from Dana R. Shaffer, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau
& Matthew Berry, Gen. Counsel, FCC, to Kathryn Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory
Affairs,
Comcast
Corp.
1-2
(Jan.
18,
2009),
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or_pdf=pdf&id document-=6520213526
[hereinafter Jan. 2009 Letter from FCC to Comcast]; Letter from Kathryn Zachem, VicePresident, Regulatory and State Legislative Affairs, Comcast Corp. to Dana R. Shaffer,
Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau & Matthew Berry, Gen. Counsel, FCC 2 (Jan. 30,
2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id_
document=-6520194593.
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management agreement with Comcast to guarantee that their services are
not degraded or blocked. '274 "Such anti-competitive, anti-consumer
practices are already against the law. And beyond that, Comcast has been
on the record as saying that they do nothing to deter their customers' use of
VolP. This announcement calls into question the company's honesty about
275
its treatment of competing services."
Antitrust law has been watchful over the potential for anticompetitive
conduct from competitor cooperation, even within the context of a standard
setting organization. 276 An ISP's private deal with an Internet application
developer could raise antitrust concerns ifsuch actions were tantamount to a
group boycott of competitors. 277 Those deals would also have to be
examined to determine if they were consistent with ISP promises to
subscribers and the marketplace.
In compliance with the FCC's August 2008 order finding that Comcast's
practices violated the Communications Act and FCC policy, in September
2 78
2008, Comcast disclosed its network management practices to the FCC.
It also discussed its plans to move to protocol-agnostic congestion
management by December 31, 2008, that would no longer specifically
target P2P or any other Internet application. 279 Comcast notified the FCC
that as of the end of 2008, it ceased employing the congestion management

274. K.C. Jones, Comcast Again Chidedfor Allegedly Blocking Internet Traffic, INFO.
WEEK, July 10, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/infrastructure/management/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=208808475.
275. Id.
276. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500-01 (1988)
(recognizing that competitors participating in a standard setting organization (SSO) have
incentives to restrain trade. The rule of reason standard measuring procompetitive benefits of
the SSO's activities against its anticompetitive effects is used where "private associations
promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and through
procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with
economic interests in stifling product competition."). Private cooperation between
competitors outside of an SSO are not accorded the same deference. See FEDERAL TRADE
COMMIsSION, FTC GUIDE TO DEALINGS WITH COMPETITORS, GROUP BoYcoTTs, available at
http://wwwftc.gov/bc/antitrust/factsheets/FactSheetBoycotts.pdf("Any company may, on
its own, refuse to do business with another firm, but an agreement among competitors not to
do business with targeted individuals or businesses may be an illegal boycott, especially if
the group of competitors working together has market power."). An agreement between an
ISP and the developer of a particular Internet application or protocol to favor that company's
Internet application should be scrutinized to ensure that the parties do not agree that the ISP
will block or degrade subscriber use of competitive applications in a manner that would be
tantamount to an agreement to engage in a group boycott. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 208 (1959).
277. See Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 208 n.1, 212. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes
illegal any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. "Group boycotts, or
concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category" and are treated as a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.Id.
278. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187.
279. Id.at 1,11.
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techniques described in its September 2008 letter that specifically identified
2 80
certain P2P applications for delay methods including resets.
As part of this "protocol-agnostic" approach, as of October 1, 2008,
Comcast imposed a 250 gigabyte (GB) a month data bandwidth
consumption limit for residential customers. 281 Comcast justified its cap by
contending that most users do not use more than two to three GB per
month. 282 Free Press noted that subscribers could exceed that cap by
"watching four hours of HD (high definition)-quality television." 283 Other
analysts have estimated that a Comcast subscriber would exceed those
bandwidth caps by watching284125 hours of high-definition video (forty-one
three-hour movies a month).
In addition to monthly bandwidth limits, Comcast announced that if it
concluded that the network was congested, whether upstream or
downstream, it will ascertain whether a particular subscriber has been a
source of congestion during a recent period of minutes and assign that
subscriber's Internet traffic lower priority. 285 This policy of assigning a
lower priority to those Comcast determines have been heavy users during
times of congestion is separate from the 250 GB per month limit. 286 Thus,

a customer could be a "heavy" user only once and have her traffic slowed
even though she uses far less than 250 GB per month.
A Comcast spokesman said the company's goal was to slow heavy
Internet users during times of congestion to speeds tantamount to "a really
good DSL experience." 2 87 If a user wanted DSL speeds they would have

280. Letter from Kathryn Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory & State Legislative
Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, FCC Sec'y (Jan. 5, 2009).
281. Comcast.net, Terms of Service-Announcement Regarding an Amendment to Our
Acceptable Use Policy, http://www.comcast.net/terms/network/amendment (last visited Oct.
3, 2009) [hereinafter Comcast Network Management Amendment]. Comcast promised to
contact customers who were using bandwidth at or above the limit to ask them to curtail their
use. Id. Comcast told the FCC that it will change the amount of bandwidth allocated for
uploads as use patterns change. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, at 3 n.4.
282. Comcast Network Management Amendment, supra note 281.
283. Erika Morphy, Comcast Rations Broadband Use at 250 GB per month,
TECHNEwSWORLD, Aug. 29, 2008, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/Comcast-RationsBroadband-Use-at-250-GB-per-Month-64358.html.
284. Evan Hessel, Cable's Capping Conundrum, Broadband Users Face a New Choice
Between High Prices and Restricted Downloading, FORBES.cOM, Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/19/cable-internet-video-bandwidth-businessmedia cable.html. In 2009, Time Warner tested Internet plans in some markets that offered
more bandwidth for higher prices with download caps ranging from five gigabytes to 150
gigabytes per month, permitting the downloading of ten high-definition movies a month at
Time Warner's top tier. Stacey L. Bradford, Get Ready To Pay More for the Web,
SMARTMONEY.COM, Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/rip-offs/get-readyto-pay-more-for-the-web/. A Cox Communications subscriber to its ISP services could
download thirty-seven high-definition movies monthly at Cox's top tier. Id.
285. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, attachment B at 2.
286. Id. attachment B at n.3.
287. Bloomberg News, Comcast To Slow Internet Service at Times to Its Heaviest Users,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at C9 (quoting Mitch Bowling, Comcast Senior Vice-President
and General Manager for Online Services).
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subscribed to DSL. Like Hart, many subscribers who want to use high
applications subscribe to Comcast because of the speeds it
bandwidth
88
offers.

2

Cable-based ISP Time Warner prohibits "use of excessive bandwidth" in
its Operator Acceptable Use Policy without defining what constitutes
excessive use. 289 Time Warner planned in April 2009 to expand the
number of markets in which it tested bandwidth caps with tiered pricing
that would have offered between 5 megabytes of bandwidth for a set fee or
up to 100 GB of bandwidth for $150 a month. 290 The company withdrew
its plans to extend tiered pricing after customer outcry, stating that they
wanted to educate customers about consumption-based billings and to
develop and provide tools to help customers understand how much
291
bandwidth they use.
PeerApp questioned whether Internet traffic shaping practices, such as
slowdown techniques based on packet inspection or bandwidth
consumption, solve the "fundamental problem: providing a more effective
mechanism to manage different applications and satisfy the subscriber
demand for all forms of multimedia content in a timely manner." 292 For the
ISP, PeerApp cautioned that "shaping can actually have an adverse affect
on the top line (revenues) by creating a poor subscriber experience, creating
'29 3
slow response and download times, and curtailing content availability.
These congestion management practices and bandwidth consumption
quotas or tiers of service are lawful under the FTC Act's deceptive conduct
proscriptions only if they are consistent with the promised level of service
and disclosures that induced entry into the contract. The FTC's Dot Corn
Disclosure Guidelines emphasize that "[d]isclosures must be effectively
communicated to consumers before they make a purchase or incur a
financial obligation." 2 94 Modification of contract terms of service and ISP
practices will not cure inadequate disclosure at the time of subscription and
may constitute an "unfair" practice under the FTC Act.2 95 For new
subscribers, disclosures must be sufficient to ensure that consumers
understand ISP network management procedures, and those practices must
be consistent with the level of Internet service the ISP promised. ISPs must
288. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, 41.
289. Time
Warner
Cable,
Operator

Acceptable

Use

Policy,

http://help.twcable.com/html/twc-mispaup.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
290. Chloe Albanesius, Cable Industry Jumps in To Defend Bandwidth Caps,
PCMAG.coM, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2345370,00.asp.
291. Chloe Albanesius, Time Warner Scraps Bandwidth Cap Testing, PCMAG.cOM, Apr.
16, 2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2345430,00.asp.
292. ACCELERATING THE VIDEO INTERNET, supra note 20, at 6.

293. Id.
294. FTC DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 118, at 11.
295. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 269.
While a full exploration of the unfair practices laws and contract modification defenses and
doctrines are beyond this Article's scope, see infra notes 318-29 and accompanying text
(providing an overview of relevant legal and equitable principles to judge such attempts to
modify ongoing ISP subscriber contracts).
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also communicate the usage levels that will trigger delays and the nature
and extent of those delays.
The FTC must also monitor the potential for unfair competition and
anticompetitive conduct if network management practices disadvantage
Internet video uses, VolP calls, or applications that compete with an ISP's
services, its affiliated businesses, or partners. Subscribers using bandwidth
intensive protocols such as some P2P applications or programs that upload
or download video are most likely to encounter ISP delays. While a user
can predict that cable modem ISP services may be busier at night and on
weekends when more people are home, the shared nature of cable
bandwidth may trigger these restrictions anytime a sufficient number of
2 96
users in a neighborhood consume an undisclosed amount of bandwidth.
Comcast's letter describing its revised network management system
raised concern at the FCC over how Comcast's policies would affect VoIP
calls over the Internet. 29 7 Comcast's disclosures stated "that customers of
other 'VoIP providers that rely on delivering calls over the public
Internet... may experience a degradation of their call quality at times of
network congestion."' 298 The FCC drew attention to Comcast's statement
on its website that proclaims "Comcast Digital Voice is a separate facilitiesbased IP phone service that is not affected by this [new network
management] technique." 29 9 The FCC asked Comcast to explain why its
filings omitted "the distinct effects that Comcast's new network
management technique has on Comcast's VolP offering versus those of its
competitors." 30 0 It also asked Comcast to explain why such "facilitiesbased" service should not be treated as a telecommunications service
30 1
subject to common-carrier obligations.
Comcast responded by emphasizing the distinction between VoIP
services provided "over-the-top" of a high speed Internet connection and
Comcast's Digital Voice which does not run over Comcast's Internet
connection. 30 2 Comcast contended that it "clearly disclosed the experience
that certain subscribers potentially could have when using their Voice-overInternet-Protocol ("VolP") applications with Comcast's HSI [High-Speed
Internet] service." 30 3 Comcast explained "[t]his might occur during the
296. See Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 11; Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra
note 187, attachment B at 2.
297. Jan. 2009 Letter from FCC to Comcast, supra note 273 (quoting Comcast,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Network
Management,
http://help.comcast.net/content/faq/Frequently-Asked-Questions-About-NetworkManagement (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Comcast Help & Support FAQ]).
298. Id. (quoting Sept. 25 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, attachment B at 13).
299. Jan. 2009 Letter from FCC to Comcast, supra note 273 (citing Comcast Help &
Support FAQ, supra note 297).
300. Jan. 2009 Letter from FCC to Comcast, supra note 273.
301. Id.
302. Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory & State Legislative
Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Dana R. Shaffer, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau & Matthew
Berry, Gen. Counsel, FCC (Jan. 30, 2009).
303. Id.
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limited times when the HSI network in a given area is experiencing
congestion, and would in all likelihood affect only a subscriber who has
temporarily triggered congestion management thresholds due to his or her
own bandwidth consumption. '30 4 Comcast added that its tests did not show
a "significant change in the quality of VoIP calls, even for managed
30 5
customer traffic during periods of congestion."
The FCC should monitor whether Comcast's congestion management
policies unduly interfere with the ability to use VoIP over the Internet or
with other applications. VolP is time-sensitive in that transmission delays
may result in jittery connections reducing the sound quality and potentially
delaying or interfering with emergency 911 calls. 30 6 Since 2005, VoIP
services have been subject to FCC rules requiring that they provide access
to e-91 1 services, an advanced version of 911 access to emergency
services. 30 7 Vonage, a company that provides VoIP over the Internet,
stressed that Vonage service may be a subscriber's "only way to make a
911 call in times of emergency." 30 8 Vonage requested that the FCC "make
it clear that any so-called network management practice that blocks or
materially degrades services or applications that provide access to 911 is
'309
presumptively unreasonable.
The FCC must ensure that ISP network management practices are
consistent with legal requirements for VoIP e-911 access and are reasonable
under the Communications Act and FCC policy. 3 10 Vonage recommended
that the FCC "[adopt] a rebuttable presumption that network management
that results in the blocking or material degradation of a service or
application that competes with a service offered by the network operator (or
its affiliate) is not reasonable. '3 11
Vonage emphasized that this
"presumption is particularly appropriate in the context of network
management, where the information necessary to demonstrate that a

304. Id.
305. Comcast Help & Support FAQ, supra note 297.
306. Comments of Vonage Holdings Corp., WC Docket 07-52, at 5 n.19 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Vonage Comments] (observing that whether a delay in
Internet transmission is material will "depend on the context-a 30 second delay in the
receipt of an email might not be material, while a 30 second delay in the receipt of a [VolP]
911 call would be").
307. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006); E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Providers, First
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245 (2005), aff'd sub
nom. Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter E911
Requirements].
308. Vonage Comments, supra note 306, at 2.
309. Id.
310. See E911 Requirements, supra note 307. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
established several policies the FCC oversees: 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) ("encourage broadband
deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public
Internet"); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (promote the "continued development of the Internet"); 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (encourage the "development of technologies [that] maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals.., who use the Internet").
311. Vonage Comments, supra note 306, at 6.

HeinOnline -- 78 Fordham L. Rev. 690 2009-2010

2009]

FTC AND NET NEUTRALITY

particular 3practice
is reasonable is largely in the hands of the network
12
operator."
The FTC must ensure that network management practices comport with
promises about the breadth of Internet access offered and do not constitute
unfair competition. Comcast's advertisements touting its own VoIP service
as "facilities-based" highlight the need to be vigilant about the potential for
anticompetitive conduct, in addition to the need for better disclosure and
network management practices consistent with the promised scope of
3 13
Internet access.
The distinction between Comcast's own voice services and VolP
provided over the Internet highlights the ISP's network architecture
decisions that affect congestion and constrain Internet bandwidth. Cablebased ISPs often allocate a small portion of their bandwidth to Internet
traffic as compared to the bandwidth they dedicate to their own video or
voice services provided over cable. It is as if the cable company built an
eight-lane highway and instead of putting the traffic median in the middle,
it placed the median between lanes seven and eight, confining all Internet
traffic to one lane while its video and voice services used the other lanes.
While the FCC resolves other proceedings to determine if Comcast's voice
services should be treated as a common-carrier service, the FCC must
ensure that Comcast and other ISPs do not disadvantage competitors or
Internet applications through unreasonable network management practices
or conduct inconsistent with the ISP's promised breadth and extent of
Internet access. Both the FTC and the FCC should prohibit ISP deception
of subscribers and Internet marketplace participants.
Other ISPs are testing new systems to manage network congestion that
raise similar concerns. Cox Communications is testing a system in two
markets to handle congestion by classifying traffic as "time sensitive" or
not; non-time-sensitive traffic is "delayed momentarily" during times of
congestion. 3 14 On the list of non-time-sensitive traffic is P2P, as well as
FTP (file transfer protocol) and software updates. 3 15 VolP is classified as
"time sensitive," marked to move through without delay. 3 16 Cox does not
specify how it will handle VolP traffic that is transmitted through P2P, such
as Skype calls. Vuze asked the FCC to investigate Cox's policy as
unreasonable network management and raised concern about the effect of

312. Id.
313. Cf Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and
Regulatory Analysis, 16 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 17 (2007) ("Assigning different

priorities to different types of packets could ensure the quality of services that are heavily
dependent on transmission quality (such as VoIP or high-definition video), but it could also
let the access provider degrade the quality of services that compete with services it might
want to sell.").
314. Cox Communications, Congestion Management FAQs (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.cox.com/policy/congestionmanagement/.
315. Id.

316. Id.
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Cox's test policies on Vuze's ten million users who
deploy Vuze's P2P
3 17
applications to legally watch video or listen to music.
Additionally, Comcast's change to time- and use-based congestion
management and monthly bandwidth limits may be inconsistent with
promises of unfettered Internet access to customers on term contracts whose
duration had not expired. Comcast's Acceptable Use Policy states that
Comcast can modify that policy's terms at any time and make those
amendments effective upon posting on its website. 3 18 Clauses that permit
contractual modifications do not shield the party making the modifications
from an unfair practices claim under the FTC Act,3 19 constitute a defense to
an FTC Act deceptive practices claim, or exempt such modifications from
other legal and equitable defenses.
The FTC has found that under certain circumstances, a unilateral attempt
to modify a contract and impose those changes on existing customers is an
unfair practice under the FTC Act. 320 In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC,
321 the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that an unfair practices claim based on
a unilateral contract change "is not an action at common law for simple
breach of contract. Rather it is an action under a federal statute that makes
unlawful conduct causing injury to consumers that is substantial,
unavoidableand without countervailing benefits.

' 322

In addition, modifications may be subject to a variety of contract
defenses: first and foremost they require both parties' assent, a condition
lacking where the subscriber is not alerted to a modification posted on a
website. 32 3 Some jurisdictions require that contract modifications be
supported by additional consideration (a bargained-for exchange of values
or detriments), 32 4 while other jurisdictions require that the modification be
317. Matthew Lasar, Vuze Callsfor FCC Probe of Cox Cable Traffic Management, ARS
Feb. 3, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/02/vuze-calls-for-fccprobe-of-cox-cable-traffic-management.ars.
318. See Comcast.net, Acceptable Use Policy, http://www.comcast.net/terms/use/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2009) ("Comcast may revise this [Acceptable Use] Policy from time to time
by posting a new version on the Web site at http://www.comcast.net or any successor
URL(s) ...Comcast will use reasonable efforts to make customers aware of any changes to
this Policy, which may include sending e-mail announcements or posting information on the
Comcast.net Web site. Revised versions of this Policy are effective immediately upon
posting.").
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 269.
320. FTC BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 130 (citing CardSystems Solutions, Inc.,
No.
C-4168
(Fed.
Trade
Comm'n
Sept.
5,
2006),
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523148/0523148CardSystemdo.pdf.).
321. 849 F.2d 1354 (11 th Cir. 1988).
322. Id. at 1367 (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 341, 349 (1986)).
323. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.
2007) ("Parties to a contract have no obligation to check the terms on a periodic basis to
learn whether they have been changed by the other side.").
324. See, e.g., Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir. 2003); Lamb v.
Emhart Corp., 47 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1995) (under Connecticut law, contract modifications
require additional consideration). The requirement of consideration to make a contract
modification enforceable prevents coercive modifications. Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chi. &
N.E. I11.
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 226 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2000).
TECHNICA,
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"fair and equitable" under unanticipated circumstances. 325 One-sided
attempts to modify a contract are also subject to the defense of procedural
326
and substantive unconscionability.
While a full exploration of the contract defenses and FTC Act unfair
practices issues raised by an ISP's attempt to modify a subscriber's ongoing
contract are beyond the scope of this Article, they highlight the limits of
contract modification to cure deceptive practices. In fact, an ISP's
unilateral contract modifications may make the ISP's practices more out of
step with its initial promises that induced the subscriber to enter into a
327
contract, substantiating an FTC Act deceptive practices claim.
Nor do these modifications resolve whether Comcast violated the FTC
Act during the time period of more than a year when Comcast explicitly
targeted P2P through deep-packet inspection. "The mere discontinuation of
an unlawful practice prior to law enforcement action does not deprive a
court of the power to grant injunctive relief. '32 8 The FTC "need not show
that the defendants are likely to engage in the same precise conduct found
to be in violation of the law, but rather only that similar violations are likely
29
to occur."

3

This analysis highlights the need for the FTC to engage in enforcement
action to police the gulf between ISP promises and practices. The FTC
should examine whether Comcast's practices, as well as those of other ISPs,
are consistent with their promises to subscribers and the marketplace.
Potential remedies for an FTC Act unfair practices violation will be
analyzed in Part VI below after analyzing whether better disclosure policies
would be sufficient to address the gap between ISP promises and practices.
Part IV examines the limited state of ISP competition for computer users in
the United States. It also examines the proliferation of restraints on the use
of certain Internet applications that undermine disclosure initiatives as a
substitute for FTC or FCC enforcement actions or net neutrality regulation.
Part V contrasts FTC deceptive practices standards with antitrust standards
to highlight the importance of FTC and FCC action in this arena.
IV. CAN BETTER ISP DISCLOSURE SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT INTERNET
CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION IN LIEU OF FTC AND FCC ENFORCEMENT?

This section examines whether better disclosure in lieu of FTC or FCC
regulatory action would be sufficient to address ISP network management

325. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981); see, e.g., Roussalis v. Wyo.
Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 240 (Wyo. 2000) (finding that a determination that modification

is fair and equitable requires an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification).
326. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866 (2002) (citing Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1997)).
327. FTC DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 118, at 11 ("Disclosures must be effectively
communicated to consumers before they make a purchase or incur a financial obligation.").
328. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., No. 06-CV-105-D, 2007 WL 4356786, at *9 (D. Wyo.

Sept. 28, 2007) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
329. Id. (citing W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633-34).
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practices in light of limited broadband competition and the nature of ISP
practices. Professor Yoo argues that better disclosure by ISPs of their terms
of service would obviate the need for net neutrality legislation or regulatory
action. 330 The FTC expressed concern about the adequacy of ISP
disclosures in its 2007 Broadband Connectivity and Competition Policy
Report:
"Important questions involving the clear and conspicuous
disclosure of material terms of broadband Internet access remain,
particularly in the event that broadband providers engage in data
discrimination, prioritization, or other traffic-shaping practices .... -"331
Professor Weiser suggested that the FTC "develop a consumer education
and consumer protection enforcement initiative in this area. ' 332 Professor
Weiser advocated that the FTC promote "a truth-in-advertising model and
encourag[e] industry self-regulation along the lines of its efforts with
respect to Internet privacy." 333 Professor Yoo cites the FTC's role in
promoting the use of privacy policies as an example of the appropriate
334
exercise of a consumer protection role.

Disclosure is the linchpin of consumer protection, Professor Yoo argues,
that, along with competitive incentives for network operators, will stave off
the need for net neutrality regulation (or antitrust complaints) to protect
competition and consumers. 335 His argument assumes there is sufficient
competition in the ISP market to promote practices that benefit consumers
and protect competition, conditions not manifest in today's marketplace.
Scholars who champion network neutrality, such as Professor Wu and
Professor van Schewick, urge broadband carriers to more fully disclose
terms of service and their limits. Professor Wu criticized Verizon Wireless
for "[a]dvertising 'unlimited bandwidth"' for customers using its wireless
Internet access, "while maintaining 'secret limits"' on subscriber use of that
bandwidth. 336 "Advertising 'unlimited bandwidth' while maintaining secret
330. Yoo, supra note 42, at 528-29; see also Douglas A. Hass, The Never-Was-Neutral
Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1565, 1630 (2007) (proposing as an alternative to net neutrality laws or regulations a
"Traffic Control Disclosure Act" modeled on the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure
Act to require consistent disclosure of the specifics of ISP service offerings and traffic
control policies).
331. FTC BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 162.
332. Weiser, supra note 43, at 291.
333. Id. at 298.
334. Yoo, supra note 42, at 529.
335. Id. at 504. Yoo argues that network neutrality is not necessary because, as a
prerequisite, a firm must have a "dominant position" in the market in order to have harmful
vertical integration. Id. Yoo contends that even if a firm possessed a dominant position, such
a firm would lack the "incentive to engage in vertical exclusion" because exclusion would
not be necessary to extract monopoly revenues and increased vertical integration could lead
to greater efficiency and profitability. Id. Some Internet applications such as video compete
with Comcast at a horizontal level creating incentives for discrimination. See Frieden, supra
note 90, at 210-11 ("In the absence of structural separation between wireline, wireless and
VolP telephone affiliates and between information and telecommunications service
providers, a vertically and horizontally integrated venture may be tempted to use packet
discrimination in ways that constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice.").
336. Wu, supra note 169, at 418.
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limits is not acceptable," Professor Wu stressed. 33 7 "Consumers must
3 38
receive truthful and meaningful information about their service plan."
Nor would such ads meet the FTC Act's standards if subjected to a
deceptive practices claim.
Disclosure and competition are often intertwined. "Competition depends
on information to work. Consumers cannot make wise decisions unless
they know, for example, the daily or monthly bandwidth limits on wireless
broadband services," 33 9 Professor Wu observed. Professor van Schewick
testified at the FCC's April 2008 en banc hearing regarding broadband
management practices that "[d]isclosure improves competition by enabling
'340
customers to make informed decisions when choosing providers.
Although essential, "[d]isclosure alone is not enough," Professor van
Schewick emphasized. 34 1 "Disclosure can only facilitate competition and
discipline providers if there is effective competition .... [C]ustomers need
to be able to switch to another provider that does not impose a similar
restriction, and they need to be able to do so at low costs. In the United
States, none of these conditions is currently satisfied. ' 342 Limited
competition in the broadband industry, along with the removal of commoncarrier regulations, undercuts the ability of disclosure to improve consumer
Internet service or ensure that Internet traffic is treated equally. 343
Free Press observed that broadband marketplace conditions and bundling
limit the effectiveness of disclosure:
Given the duopoly nature of the broadband marketplace and Comcast's
dominant position in that marketplace (as well as the multichannel video
and on demand marketplace), simple disclosure of its deceptive network
management practices are not enough. There is not enough competition
to enable consumers to use their power of choice to discipline Comcast's
bad behavior. Switching costs are too high, broadband products are
bundled, and Comcast (and other cable providers) are not344
engaging in
head-to-head competition with incumbent telecom providers.
The U.S. broadband marketplace for nonmobile services is dominated by a
duopoly of cable-modem broadband providers and telephone-line-based
providers predominantly offering DSL services. 34 5 Duopoly does not offer
sufficient consumer choice or competition.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 417.
340. van Schewick FCC Testimony, supra note 159, at 1.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 4.
343. Wu, supra note 169, at 417; van Schewick FCC Testimony, supra note 159. Nor are
all households offered the same array of Internet access providers, narrowing choices
especially for rural and ex-urban customers, or those to whom new or upgraded networks
have not been provided, including some low-income neighborhoods.
344. Free Press Reply Comments, supra note 231, at 6.
345. The FCC reported that in June 2008, among 88.4 million high speed Internet lines
that exceed 200 kbps both ways, "74.5 million lines were designed to serve primarily
residential end users. Of these, cable modem represented 49.2% while 31.3% were ADSL
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On the basis of the FCC's belief that the market for high-speed Internet
access was competitive, the Commission lifted nondiscrimination
obligations from providers of high-speed Internet access in 2005.346
Professor Crawford characterized the FCC's actions in removing
nondiscrimination requirements from facilities-based ISPs as a shift "from
the notion that non-discriminatory
access to general-purpose
communications networks is always necessary because of their public-ness
and the spillover effects they create (non-discrimination presumption) to the
idea that non-discriminatory requirements are only necessary where firms
'347
have monopoly power (discrimination presumption).
Professor Werbach points out that "[t]wo companies-AT&T and
Verizon-control the lion's share of the nationwide DSL access market; a
small number of cable operators, led by Comcast and Time Warner, are
their primary competitors."' 348 Bill Herman noted that in 2006, the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, a measure of market concentration, would
have measured 5000 for most broadband markets dominated by DSL and
Cable Internet Services, signifying that the market was highly
concentrated.

349

To determine the level of market concentration Internet users face, the
relevant market would first have to be defined, a process borrowed from
antitrust principles. Market definition is based in large part on whether

[asynchronous DSL], 0.2% were SDSL [synchronous DSL] or traditional wireline, 2.9%
were fiber to the end user premises, and 16.5% used other technologies." FCC 2008 HIGHSPEED INTERNET ACCESS REPORT, supra note 193, at 3.

The FCC has used a one-

dimensional measurement-speed-to define broadband. According to this definition the
FCC classifies all Internet services offering more than 200kb of speed in one direction as
high-speed, regardless of restrictions on those services such as limits on device or computer
attachment, content use, bandwidth limits, or congestion management practices that restrain
substitutability between Internet services. Such restrictions limit consumer ability to
substitute between services indicating that they should not be classified as competing in the
same market. See CATHERINE SANDOVAL, MEASURING INTERNET ACCESS SUBSTITUTES AND
SERVICE GAPS (2009), available at http://www.broadband.gov/docs/wsbenchmarks/
sandoval.ppt; FCC Faces Tough Challenge Getting Broadband Benchmarks Right, Experts
Agree,

WASHINGTON

INTERNET

DAILY,

Sept.

3,

2009,

at

3,

http://www.digitalgovernment.com/media/Downloads/assetuploadfile463_2605.pdf
346. Crawford, supra note 53, at 882.
347. Id. at 882-83 (emphasis omitted).
348. Werbach, supra note 70, at 374 (citing Alex Goldman, Top 23 U.S. ISPs by
Subscriber: Q3 2008, ISP-PLANET.COM, Aug. 29, 2008, http://ISP-planet.com/research/
rankings/usa.html).
349. Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality,
59 FED. COmm.L.J. 103, 126 (2006). "Market concentration is a function of the number of
firms in a market and their respective market shares ....The HHI is calculated by summing
the squares of the individual market shares of all the participants." Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,557-58, § 1.5 (Apr. 2, 1992, revised Apr. 8, 1997); see
also Catherine Sandoval, Antitrust Language Barriers: First Amendment Constraints on
Defining an Antitrust Market by a Broadcast's Language, and its Implications for
Audiences, Competition, and Democracy, 60 FED. COmm.L.J. 407, 419, 446 (2008) (market
definition determines the number of market participants and concentration levels).
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products are substitutes for each other.350 Internet access speeds advertised
for cable are significantly higher than those for DSL, 35 1 raising the issue of
whether DSL and cable-based Internet are differentiated products that
compete in the same market or whether they are so distinct that they
compete in separate submarkets or product markets. This important
question is beyond this paper's span (and not necessary to resolve an FTC
Act deceptive practices claim), but merits further scholarly and agency
examination. Scholars and agencies studying this issue should analyze
whether the market is tiered so that Internet users who demand lower
speeds would consider DSL and cable-based Internet service to be
substitutes, keeping in mind that other ISP practices such as bandwidth and
application restrictions may also affect substitutability. They should also
examine whether Internet users who want higher speeds and more
bandwidth for extensive use of applications such as video or P2P perceive
DSL and cable-based Internet service as substitutes.
Advertising
representations and ISP practices shape consumer perception and
willingness to switch in the face of a price increase of one service, factors
relevant to the inquiry into substitutability and market definition.
Advertisements draw customers to cable's claims about its peak Internet
speeds, although the shared bandwidth of cable-modem-based Internet
results in slower average speeds, especially during peak periods when
multiple users in a neighborhood are trying to access the Internet. 352 Even
if a consumer wanted to switch to a DSL provider, the consumer might not
understand that representations about cable-modem Internet speeds
represent peak speeds, whereas the advertised speed of a DSL connection is
both its peak and its average. 3 53 Others who want to use applications that
require sustained data rates above DSL's average speeds may not see DSL
as a substitute, even though cable's peak speeds are no guarantee of
350. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,557-58, § 1.1 (Apr. 2, 1992,
revised Apr. 8, 1997).
351. For example, Cable-based ISP Comcast advertises high speed Internet access from
12 Mbps (megabytes per second) to 50 Mbps, Comcast, The New Comcast High-Speed

Internet: Speed Comparison, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/HighSpeedlnternet/
speedcomparison.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009); Cable-based ISP Cox advertises high speed
Internet access from 1.5 Mbps to 25 Mbps, Cox Communications, High Speed Internet
Services,
http://ww2.cox.com/residential/santabarbara/internet.cox?campcode=classicpop hsi 0409
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009); AT&T offers DSL up to 6 Mbps downstream and 768 Kbps
(kilobytes per second) upstream, AT&T, Plan Details-AT&T High Speed Internet Elite,
http://www.att.com/gen/general?pid=10938 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009); Verizon advertises
high speed Internet access from 1 mbps to 7.1 mbps for download speed (downstream) and
384 Kbps to 768 Kbps upstream, Verizon, High Speed Internet:
Plans,
http://www22.verizon.com/ResidentialVHighSpeedlntemet/Plans/Plans.htm (last visited Oct.
3, 2009).
352. See Comcast Comments, supra note 22, at 11.
353. FUNDAMENTALS OF DSL TECHNOLOGY 124 (Philip Golden, Herv6 Dedieu & Krista
Jacobsen eds., 2006) (the average bit rate on a cable network is less than the peak rate); see
id. at 161 ("One advantage of DSL relative to other means of providing broadband in the last
mile, such as cable modems or wireless access, is that each subscriber has a dedicated
transmission medium-the phone line.").
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sustained or average speed. Customers who do not understand or have
enough information to make this distinction may be deterred by DSL's
slower theoretical speeds.
Better disclosure may help consumers make this distinction. Professor
Weiser recommended "companies should inform consumers of the effective
level of bandwidth (as opposed to a hypothetically possible level of
bandwidth) provided by their broadband connection. ' 354 I concur that more
accurate representations about the speed and level of service offered would
help consumers and courts determine whether DSL is a substitute for cablemodem-based Internet and competes in the same relevant market.
Even if cable and DSL were substitutes for some consumers, many
American households could obtain high-speed access to the Internet only
via cable-modem or DSL, but not through both. The FCC found that as of
June 2008, cable modem high-speed Internet service was available in only
67% of U.S. zip codes. 3 55 The FCC found that 37% of U.S. zip codes in
June 2008 did not report both cable-modem and DSL subscribers. 356 In
those markets, consumers wanting high-speed broadband access for their
personal computer faced an effective monopoly provider, leaving them no
workable alternative. 357 That lack of competition or choice limits the
effectiveness of disclosure as a tool to protect consumers or competition.
Verizon's FIOS and AT&T's Uverse Internet service using fiber optic
cables are available in limited areas. 3 58 As of August 2009 FIOS did not
354. Weiser, supra note 43, at 291. Professor Weiser recommended that "the FTC should
develop some basic guidance as to what information is important for consumers to
understand vis-A-vis their broadband Internet access connections." Id. Weiser argues that
companies should inform consumers of the effective or average level of bandwidth speed for
their broadband connection, as opposed to the hypothetical speed. Id.
355. FCC 2008 HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ACCESS REPORT, supra note 193, at 4.
356. Id. at n.9 (63% of zip codes report both Asynchronous DSL, the most common type
DSL, and cable modem subscribers). Criticisms abound of the FCC's methodology that
reported broadband penetration by zip code, which "considers the entire zip code served if
one user exists [who can get such service in that zip code], regardless of the circumstances or
price paid." Rob Frieden, Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics: Developing a ClearerAssessment
of Market Penetration and Broadband Competition in the United States 15 (Dickinson
School of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 13-2008, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=l 159727. Internet service may not be
available to all residents or businesses in that zip code, particularly for those in rural or less
populated areas. Id. at 17. Although the FCC's statistics likely overstated broadband access,
these meager indicators revealed that even at the zip code level, not all communities, let
alone households, had the opportunity to choose between cable and DSL-based Internet
service. The FCC recognized that the zip code methodology was "insufficiently granular or
precise to inform necessary policymaking" and is now collecting data by Census Track level.
FCC 2008 HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ACCESS REPORT, supra note 193, at 1.
357. Many wireless carriers that offer Internet access restrict bandwidth use and prohibit
access to certain applications and websites. Wu, supra note 169, at 418. These limits
indicate that wireless Internet is not a competitive substitute, even if available. See, e.g.,
AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms and Conditions, supra note 3 (stating that unless
specifically designated for tethering, service plans cannot be used for any application that
tethers the device to Personal Computers or any equipment for any purpose).
358. Verizon,
FiosFAQ.com,
Availability,
http://www.fiosfaq.com/
index.php?action=cat&catnum=3 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009); AT&T, Check AT&T Uverse
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impose bandwidth limits, but its acceptable use policy prohibits subscribers
from generating excessive Internet traffic, a level it does not define.35 9
According to the FCC, mobile wireless Internet grew to 35% of the
market for high-speed Internet lines by June 2007 under the FCC's
assumption that the relevant market should be defined by the single
characteristic of minimum speed. 360 This assumption ignores the fact that
carrier policies limit consumer ability to substitute mobile wireless for
terrestrial Internet services, especially for those who want to use P2P,
video, or computers. 361 Several wireless ISPs require separate plans to
allow a mobile phone to be linked (tethered) to a computer to provide
computer Internet access over their network. 362 Other mobile providers
contractually limit or prohibit use of P2P applications. 363 Sprint Mobile
Broadband offers up to 5 gigabytes or 300 megabytes of data a month with
additional usage at five cents a megabyte. 364 Sprint also reserves the right
to limit data "throughput or the amount of data you can transfer" or to
"limit or suspend any heavy, continuous data usage that adversely impacts
our network performance or hinders access to our network. '365 Sprint
promised in 2008 that its WiMax-based Internet service being deployed
366
would be an "open Internet model" without restrictions on applications.
Yet, its terms of use state that it may use "various tools and techniques
designed to limit the bandwidth available for certain bandwidth intensive
367
applications or protocols, such as file sharing."
Availability,
https://uverse 1.att.com/un/launchAMSSNotAuthenticated.do?target-action=
serviceabilityCheck (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
359. Verizon, Policies Section, http://netservices.verizon.net/portalllink/main/selectregion
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009); Verizon, FiosFAQ.com, Does Verizon Fios Have Hidden
Bandwidth Caps?, http://www.fiosfaq.com/content.php?contentid=27 (last visited Oct. 3,
2009).
360. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking BroadbandInternet Access, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2008) (citing INDUs. ANALYSIS & TECH. BUREAU, FCC, HIGHSPEED SERVICE FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2007, at tbl.1 (2008),

availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-280906A1 .pdf).
361. See SANDOVAL, supra note 345, at 2, 5.
362. Sprint, PCS Terms & Conditions, http://www.sprintpcs.com/common/popups/
popLegalTermsPrivacy.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Sprint Mobile Broadband
Terms] (specifying that Sprint prohibits using a phone as a modem in connection with a
computer, PDA, or similar device except with phone-as-modem plans).
363. See, e.g., AT&T, Wireless Data Service Terms and Conditions, supra note 3
(prohibiting use of P2P for intranet browsing); XOHM, Acceptable Use Policy,
http://www.xohm.com/enUS/xohm-policies/acceptable-use.html#aup 2b (last visited Oct.
3, 2009) [hereinafter XOHM Acceptable Use Policy] (reserving the right to limit file sharing
Internet applications).
364. Sprint, Mobile Broadband Connection Plan-3G, http://nextelonline.nextel.com/
NASApp/onlinestore/en/Action/DisplayPlans?filterString=dndividual-Plans-Filter&idl 2=U
HP PlansTab Link IndividualPlans (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
365. Sprint Mobile Broadband Terms, supra note 362.
366. Grant Gross, Xohm WiMax Usage Policy Says Sprint Can Enforce Bandwidth
Limits,

COMPUTERWORLD

NETWORKING

&

INTERNET,

Sept.

30,

2008,

http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command-viewArticleBasic&articleld=91
15905.
367. XOHM Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 363.
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The iPhone limits subscriber ability to download Internet applications to
only those approved by Apple and available on the iPhone store. 36 8 The
FCC is investigating why Apple did not approve Google's voice application
for the iPhone. 369 Apple permits subscribers to use an application from
Sling Media that allows users to watch on their iPhone television programs
transmitted from a Slingbox on Wi-Fi networks only, rather than the AT&T
network on which iPhone runs. 3 70 In October 2009 Apple reversed its
policies that constrained iPhone subscriber use of Skype to Wi-Fi networks,
which limited subscriber ability to substitute Internet applications for
AT&T's phone service. 3 7 1 These carrier-imposed restrictions indicate that
wireless phones or smart phones are complements, not substitutes for
wireline or cable Internet access.
Satellite-based Internet requires a clear view of the southern sky, a
vantage point many Internet users do not enjoy. 372 Satellite Internet also
suffers from latency, "the amount of time it takes a packet of data to travel
across a network. With satellite service, that data must travel up to the
satellite and back (about 45,000 miles).

' 373

HughesNet advises users that

these levels of latency make its satellite-based Internet service unsuitable
for some applications such as VoIP and other real-time applications such as
3 74
video conferencing.
HughesNet's satellite-based Internet service limits the amount of data
that users may download daily, varying with the level of service
purchased. 375 HughesNet states that "[s]ubscribers who exceed that
threshold will experience reduced download speeds for approximately 24
hours. During this recovery period, the HughesNet service may still be
used, but speeds will be slower .... If they continue these activities during
this recovery period, reduced download speeds may continue beyond 24
hours." 3 76 HughesNet's rolling 24 hour delays raise questions about
whether its actions fall within the FCC's policy for reasonable network
management and whether HughesNet will apprise customers of those
delays.
368. Troy Wolverton & John Boudreau, Apple, AT&T App Ties Probed, FCC Seeks
Explanation on Why Google Voice Was Rejected for iPhone, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Aug. 1, 2009, at Al.

369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Ray Singel, AT&T Relents, Opens iPhone to Skype, VoIP, WIRED, Oct. 6, 2009,
see Leslie Cauley, Skype's
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/10/iphone-att-skype/;

iPhone Limits

Irk Some

Consumer Advocates,

USA

TODAY,

Apr.

2,

2009,

http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2009-04-01-att-skypeiphoneN.htm.

372. HughesNet, Satellite Internet Access, http://www.nationwidesatellite.com/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2009).
373. HughesNet, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nationwidesatellite.com/
HughesNet/service/hughesnet faq.asp#19 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).

374. Id.
375. HughesNet,

Fair Access

Policy Overview,

http://www.nationwidesatellite.coml

HughesNet/service/HughesNet fair accesspolicy.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
376. Id.
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Competition may be on the distant horizon but is not yet a reality for
most people who want to connect their computers to the Internet. Nor do
mobile phones provide a competitive check on ISP practices in light of their
limited computing functions and wireless ISP constraints on Internet access
and application downloads. The current state of limited competition and
the proliferation of ISP restraints against certain Internet applications
enfeeble disclosure as a substitute for FTC Act or Communications Act
enforcement.
In accordance with FTC guidelines, subsequent disclosures cannot cure
the failure to make full disclosure of ISP policies and practices that
materially undermine representations designed to entice subscription. Even
if full disclosure was made at the time of subscription about the partial
Internet access offered and ISP methods of patrolling access, the FTC
should examine such restraints to determine if they constitute unfair
competition or violate the antitrust laws, and are consistent with the ISP's
marketing representations, while the FCC should determine whether they
are lawful under the Communications Act.
V. QUALIFIED REFUSALS To DEAL, UNFAIR COMPETITION, ANTITRUST
AND FTC ACT DECEPTIVE CONDUCT STANDARDS

FTC Commissioner Rosch questioned whether ISP prohibitions against
use of a particular Internet protocol may be characterized as a "refusal to
deal," creating a defense to an unfair competition claim under the FTC Act
or a Sherman Act antitrust claim. 377 "Refusals to deal" have been
378
interpreted to allow parties to choose with whom they will do business.
The Supreme Court has observed that the "Sherman Act 'does not restrict
the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer ... to exercise his
' 379
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.'
In two cases involving telecommunications companies, the Supreme
Court has distinguished between an "antitrust duty to deal," or the lack
377. Rosch Broadband Speech, supra note 104, at 8 (characterizing Comcast's actions as
a constructive refusal to deal).
378. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (recognizing a trader's
freedom to choose with whom she will deal). A refusal to deal is not implied by promises of
unfettered access to all of the content the Internet has to offer or unlimited Internet access.
Such broad promises without conspicuous disclosures of limitations imply the oppositethat the ISP will deal, making this defense of a Sherman Act violation unavailable, assuming
other elements of a Sherman Act claim are proven including monopoly or market power,
depending on the cause of action alleged.
379. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). Trinko
emphasized that claims that satisfied antitrust standards are preserved. Id. at 406. Trinko
does not disturb the FTC Act's applicability to ISPs, as the Court recognized that Congress
included a clause in the Telecommunications Act stating that it did not preempt the antitrust
laws and any other laws of the United States. Id. ("'[N]othing in [the Telecommunications
Act of 1996] ...shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any
of the antitrust laws."' (quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 601(b)(l), 110 Stat. 143
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006)))).
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thereof, and compelled access or sharing forced by FCC regulations. 380 In
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, the Court
found that a telephone company had no duty to deal based in antitrust lawthe antitrust laws did not compel dealing with another company on
preferable terms or even the provision of sufficient service, absent a
showing of abuse of monopoly power.38 1 Trinko held that "insufficient
assistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust
claim under . . . existing refusal-to-deal precedents. '382 In Pacific Bell
Telephone v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 3 83 the Court held that a
telephone company faced with an independent ISP's request for access to
the telephone network to offer customers independent Internet service had
"no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at wholesale [in the wholesale
market]; any such duty arises only from FCC regulations, not from the
'384
Sherman Act."
Trinko recognized that a refusal-to-deal claim may be cognizable where
the defendant had previously "engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals,
or would ever have done so absent statutory compulsion" and other
elements of an antitrust claim are met. 385 For Comcast, neither the
announcement of "unfettered access to all the content, services and
applications that the intemet has to offer" 386 nor protocol-agnostic
congestion management policies communicate a refusal to deal with any
lawful Internet protocol or application provider.
Similarly, AT&T's
promise of "unlimited messaging and unlimited data for your BlackBerry to
connect you with your world, including your email, contacts, the web and
more" 387 does not announce a refusal to deal. Broad promises of Internet
access imply the opposite; the ISP will deal. Comcast's pattern of allowing
use of P2P prior to revelations of its use of resets in early 2007 may also
establish a course of dealing.388 Announcements of unlimited messaging,
380. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406-10; Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns., Inc., 129 S.

Ct. 1109 (2009).
381. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406-10.
382. Id. at 410.
383. 129 S. Ct. 1109(2009).
384. Id. at 1119.
385. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. See also Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell At. Corp., 398 F.3d
666, 675-78 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court's dismissal of Covad's claims of
monopolization and attempted monopolization based on allegations that Bell Atlantic
unlawfully refused to deal with would-be customers who had orders for DSL service
pending with Covad, where the complaint sufficiently alleged that the refusal to deal resulted
from a predatory practice such as profit sacrifice designed to drive out competitors).
386. Hart Complaint, supra note 2, 40.
387. AT&T
BlackBerry
Features,
http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phoneservice/services/services-list.jsp?catld=cat 1510007&LOSGId=&catName =
BlackBerry%C2%AE+Features (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). Cf AT&T Wireless Data Services
Terms and Conditions, supra note 3.
388. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187 (Comcast began trials using
Sandvine's programs that inspect the type and nature of packets passing through Comcast's
Internet access network in May 2005 and widely deployed Sandvine technology in 2007 to
identify P2P uploads it determined to be a source of Internet congestion and issue "reset
packets" to delay unidirectional uploads). Comcast did not refuse to deal with P2P or
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data, and Internet access indicate a willingness to deal, though the ISP's
contracts suggest latitude to do otherwise.
Professor Weiser argues that better disclosure would theoretically not
only improve consumer service, "but application providers will be in a
better position to manage their offerings and compete based on an
understanding of how the marketplace is evolving." 389 Application
developers are harmed not only by the lack of clear disclosure of network
management policies, but also by practices that contradict promises of open
access to the marketplace.
For an FTC Act deceptive conduct claim, a clear, conspicuous
announcement of a "refusal to deal," consistent with and proximate to
prominent representations of the limited service offered (a practice not in
evidence in today's ISP marketplace) might constitute a defense to a
deceptive practices claim.
The FTC Act requires that disclosures
prominently and conspicuously in relation to the advertising claims inform
and warn consumers about the limited service offered. 390
These
requirements are not met by either vague reservations of the right to engage
in network management, or by specific limits on the use of Internet
applications separated by placement, proximity, and inconspicuousness
from bold promises of unlimited or unfettered Internet access.
In many cases, consumers and application developers face fine print
restrictions limiting use of some Internet applications, contradicted by ISP
advertising promises of unlimited Internet or data access. 39 1 This
disjunction leaves both subscribers and application developers uncertain
about ISP promises and policies and unable to manage around them.
Additionally, the right to refuse to deal with other firms is not
unqualified. 392 The potential anticompetitive harms from any such clearly
announced refusals to deal may be analyzed under the Sherman Act or the
FTC Act's unfair competition provisions, which require that the service
"manage" its use on a widespread basis until 2007, though it only disclosed these practices
per the FCC's August 2008 order. The Supreme Court decided the BrandX case on June 27,

2005, affirming the FCC's decision to reclassify cable-modem ISPs as information services
providers instead of common carriers and remove nondiscrimination obligations. Nat'l Cable

& Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005). It is noteworthy
that Comcast began trials using Sandvine to detect traffic patterns after the BrandX case was
argued. Once Brand X affirmed the FCC's decision not to impose common-carrier
obligations on cable-based ISPs, Comcast continued its experiments with Sandvine's packet
inspection programs and deployed reset techniques in 2007. This timeline highlights the
importance of the regulatory shift in enabling the use of deep-packet inspection technologies.

389. Weiser, supra note 43, at 290; see Speta, supra note 68, at 243 ("[T]hose providing
information and services 'on the Internet' and those purchasing access 'to the Internet' share
an expectation of mutual, universal interconnection . . . that he or she will be able to reach
everyone else using the Internet.").
390. Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 842-43 (1984) (stating that effective
disclosures must be clear and conspicuous).
391. See, e.g., AT&T, Plan Terms, supra note 26.

392. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v.Law Offices of Curtis V.Trinko, LLP,540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004) (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601

(1985)).
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provider have market or monopoly power in the relevant market, or that it
arise from a conspiracy, as required by the cause of action pleaded. 393 In an
antitrust case based on a theory other than conspiracy, if the plaintiff were
to carry her burden of proving such market power and anticompetitive harm
from the practice, the defendant would have the burden of showing a
394
procompetitive justification, which the plaintiff must then rebut.
Determining whether any ISP has market or monopoly power largely rests
on how the relevant market is defined. That project lies beyond this
Article's focus but should be illuminated by the FCC's examination of the
395
broadband market.
Harm to Internet application providers from ISP practices that disfavor
certain Internet protocols may also be examined under the FTC Act's
prohibitions of "[u]nfair methods of competition. ' 396 If the ISP in question
393. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition under the
FTC Act); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (stating that an abuse of monopoly power claim under §
2 of the Sherman Act requires both monopoly power in the relevant market and 'the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident' (quoting United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966))); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480-86 (1992) (explaining that monopoly power in an
aftermarket may demonstrate a § 2 violation even if the primary market for the product is
competitive where its purported business justifications fail to explain respondent's conduct);
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610-11 (finding a refusal to deal anticompetitive where a company
possesses monopoly power and there is evidence of willingness "to sacrifice short-run
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller
rival"); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) (stating that
tying arrangements are condemned where the seller has market power to force a purchaser to
do something he would not do in a competitive market); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (stating that a tying arrangement violates § 1 of the
Sherman Act if the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market and if
the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market). See also
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 208 n.1 (1959) (noting Section 1 of
the Sherman Act makes illegal any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade); Speta, supra note 68, at 277 ("[B]ecause antitrust litigation requires extensive
discovery to establish proof of market power, an antitrust claim is likely to prove difficult
and costly to prosecute.").
394. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman
Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 483) ("If the monopolist asserts a procompetitive justification-a
nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it
involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal-then the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim.").
395. Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended
by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN
Docket No. 09-137, GN Docket No. 09-5 1) (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Aug. 7, 2009).
396. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239
(1972) (stating the FTC may "define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even
though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws");
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464-65 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318
(2009) (noting that to be condemned, monopolist's deceptive conduct must have
anticompetitive effect); see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 n.9 (1999)
(citing FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1934)) (stating that false or
misleading advertising may constitute unfair competition under the FTC Act).
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had monopoly power in the relevant geographic and product market,
Internet application developers may stand in a similar position to the
software developers who used Microsoft's Java tools to write programs
397
they believed would run on Java and create a competitive platform.
Instead those Microsoft tools created applications that would only run on
Microsoft's Windows operating system. 398 The D.C. Circuit held that
Microsoft's conduct with regard to its Java tools was deceptive and violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 399 As the Java tools example highlights, an
analysis of the relevant antitrust market, monopoly power, market power,
and the potentially anticompetitive and deceptive effect of ISP use of resets,
application- or bandwidth-based slowdown techniques, and deep-packet
inspection merits regulatory examination and additional scholarly analysis.
Jerry Brito and Jerry Ellig recommend that "regulators should apply the
'40 0
antitrust 'rule of reason' analysis to these restrictive business practices.
Such analysis would require the FTC or the FCC to define the relevant
market and determine if the firm whose practices are being challenged has
market or monopoly power before weighing the harm and justifications for
those practices. 40 1 Brito and Ellig suggest that the "FTC could conduct
enforcement activities under the Federal Trade Commission Act, whereby
practices alleged to violate net neutrality would be analyzed under the
antitrust rule of reason. '40 2 Similarly, Jonathan Nuechterlein argues that
the Department of Justice and the FTC are best positioned to resolve net
4 03
neutrality disputes based on competition and antitrust policy.
The legal inquiry into whether Comcast's, or any other ISP's, Internet
access promises are deceptive under the FTC Act rests on a different legal
theory and standards than antitrust policy based on abuse of market or
monopoly power or the FTC's unfair competition standards.
The
Communications Act and FCC rules also create different legal duties and
standards, as the Supreme Court recognized in Linkline.40 4 Allegations of
deceptive ISP conduct highlight the potential for ISP interference with
Internet content and use that is at the heart of the net neutrality debate.
An examination of the relevant market and proof of market or monopoly
power are not prerequisites for an FTC Act deceptive practices claim, an
FTC Act unfairness claim, or enforcement under the Communications Act
and other FCC regulations. In banning deceptive, as well as unfair,
practices, Congress recognized that in transactions in which consumers do
not get what they were promised, consumers could be hurt by deceptive and
unfair conduct before a firm has monopoly or market power. In addition,
the FTC Act's unfair competition standard is broad and was added as a
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Brito & Ellig, supra note 313, at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 34.
Nuechterlein, supra note 6 1, at 21.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009).
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Act to reach trade practices that harmed
complement to the Sherman
40 5
consumers and competition.
These distinctive standards highlight the limits of ex post antitrust
enforcement to discipline competitors in markets characterized by limited
competition. Whether or not ISP market or monopoly power is proven, the
FTC and the FCC can and should address harm to consumers, competition,
and the public interest caused by deceptive practices.
VI. FTC ACT DECEPTIVE PRACTICES CLAIM: PROPOSAL FOR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES To REDRESS DECEPTIVE

ISP NETWORK

MANAGEMENT CONDUCT
4 06
Half the truth is of no use. Give it all, give it all to me.

As a case study of the FTC Act's deceptive conduct proscriptions as a
limit on ISP practices, this analysis highlighted the contradictions between
Comcast's promises of unfettered Internet access and its furtive practices
that delayed certain Internet applications. The FTC must determine
whether Comcast's representations, as well as those of other ISPs, were
deceptive in light of the broad level of Internet access offered and vague
disclosures contained in separate documents. FTC inquiry and enforcement
in this area would emphasize the need for ISP conduct consistent with
promises to the marketplace.
The FTC is empowered to issue injunctions to stop misleading
conduct. 40 7 That injunction should prohibit advertisement of "unlimited" or
"unfettered" Internet access or other words that communicate a similar
breadth of Internet access, unless that is what the ISP actually provides.
The FTC should declare that advertising unlimited data or Internet access
while elsewhere limiting uses of legal Internet applications or bandwidth is
deceptive. The FTC should take enforcement action against ISPs who
violate that principle and initiate enforcement under the FTC Act to redress
harms to consumers and Internet application developers from deceptive
practices that do not comport with an ISP's promises.
Karl Bode, a commentator on Internet policy, emphasized that
"advertising a limited service as unlimited is still false advertising." 40 8

405. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (stating that the FTC

has authority to "define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the
practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws"); FTC v. Ind.
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (explaining that the FTC unfairness standard
encompasses not only antitrust law violations but practices the Commission determines are
against public policy for other reasons).
406. CARLY SIMON, Give Me All Night, on COMING AROUND AGAIN (C'est Music 1987).
407. FTC v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 66 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that § 13(b) of the
FTC Act provides that "'in proper cases the [FTC] may seek, and after proper proof, the
court may issue, a permanent injunction' (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)
(2006))).
408. Karl Bode, Why Are ISPs Still Advertising Limited Services as Unlimited? Better
Question:
Why Are They Still Getting Away with It? (Dec. 19, 2008),
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Bode quipped, "Sign me up for the $75 'granny usage EXTREME'
600kbps tier with 5GB monthly cap and $1/per GB overages if you must.
Just don't lie to me." 4 09 If an ISP imposes significant use limits, whether
based on bandwidth consumption at any time period (which should be
specified) or limits against any Internet applications or protocols or other
significant restrictions, the FTC should enjoin the ISP from advertising its
Internet service or minutes of use as unlimited, unfettered, unrestricted, and
the like.
Nor should reservations of rights to manage the network at the ISP's
discretion be permitted to circumvent promises of broad access. The FTC
should also make clear that ISPs may not attempt to contract away user
rights under the FTC Act and the FCC should do the same regarding rights
under the Communications Act and FCC policy.
ISPs should be required to disclose their network management policies in
sufficient detail so that when a consumer purchases ISP service, that
consumer is well-informed about the type and level of Internet service they
will receive and how their Internet traffic will be treated.
Internet
marketing representations designed to entice subscribers are also
representations to the marketplace, including applications developers, of the
type of Internet service offered and how applications will be treated.
Participants in the Internet's two-sided marketplace must be informed of
ISP policies and not subject to surreptitious interference. Such disclosure
must go beyond reservations to do whatever the ISP believes is reasonable
in its sole judgment. Declarations that the ISP may modify its practices or
limit user rights in the future are also insufficient. Disclosure must be
consistent with the level and breadth of service the ISP promised to
subscribers at the time the contract was made.
Free Press, the public interest organization that petitioned the FCC to rule
on whether Comcast's activities violated FCC rules, has called on the FCC
to initiate a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking "requiring all broadband
service providers to disclose in detail any network activities that monitor or
interfere with any level of communications by end users to access or share
lawful content and applications on the Internet. '4 10 That FCC notice should
propose that ISPs disclose their specific network and Internet use
monitoring, traffic "shaping," bandwidth, or application delay policies to
enable consumer choice, evaluate the effect of those policies on competition
and the Internet's development, and determine whether those practices are
consistent with the type and extent of Internet access the ISP promised.
Even though Comcast's new congestion policy is touted as protocolagnostic, it is likely to trigger delays for certain applications on the basis of

http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Why-Are-ISPs-Still-Advertising-Limited-Services-

As-Unlimited-99769.
409. Id. 600 kbps would be a very slow Internet service.
410. Free Press, Notice of Ex Parte Filing, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Oct. 24, 2008).
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bandwidth consumption. 4 11 The inability of a subscriber or application
developer to predict the timing and nature of these delays indicates that the
proposed system has not resolved the issue of whether such practices are
deceptive in light of the ISP's representations.
Increasing transparency in the scope of Internet service offered and ISP
network management practices is important. 4 12 Disclosure policies must,
however, be coupled with FTC enforcement of laws prohibiting deceptive
and unfair practices and unfair competition, and FCC enforcement of the
Communications Act.
The deceptive use of practices such as deploying reset messages to block
or delay applications in the name of "network management" defy disclosure
as a means to improve consumer choice or competition and require the FTC
to condemn such practices and seek restitution for those harmed thereby.
Disclosure sufficient to warn consumers, Internet application developers,
and competitors about the use of resets, slowdown policies, and deeppacket inspection is difficult to conceive. Techniques designed to be
clandestine and to deflect attention from the ISP as the source of
interference or delays cannot be papered over by disclosure. Judge Frank
H. Easterbrook quoted Arthur C. Clarke, who said that "[a]ny sufficiently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic" by those who do not
understand its principles. 4 13 Resets may seem more like a spell than magic.
That technique when abused to "manage networks" is pernicious, deceptive,
and anticompetitive. The nefarious nature of resets when used to delay
certain Internet applications defies meaningful disclosure. No amount of
disclosure that resets or similar techniques may be used should constitute a
defense to claims under the FTC Act, the Communications Act, or the
Sherman Act.
The FTC may seek restitution and other equitable damages to
"The appropriate measure for
compensate consumers for harm. 4 14

411. Sept. 25, 2008 Comcast Letter, supra note 187, attachment B at 2.
412. See ARBOR NETWORKS, supra note 259, at 7 ("[T]ransparency with customers is
critical to success. Experience reveals that when providers disclose how, when and why they
manage bandwidth, the result is increased customer satisfaction, reduced chum and
enhanced communication.").
413. FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing ARTHUR C. CLARKE,
PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 36 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1984)).
414. FTC v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 66 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) ("'Section 13(b) [of the
FTC Act] carries with it the authorization for the district court to exercise the full range of
equitable remedies traditionally available to it."' (quoting FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665
F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982))); id. at 66 n.7 ("'[W]here Congress allows resort to equity for
the enforcement of a statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the district court are
available for the proper and complete exercise of the court's equitable jurisdiction, unless the
statute explicitly, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, limits the scope of that
jurisdiction."' (quoting FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314 (8th
Cir. 1991))); id. at 66 n.9 ("'[A]bsent a clear command to the contrary, the district court's
equitable powers are extensive." and include "'the power to grant restitution and
disgorgement."' (quoting FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11 th Cir. 1996))).
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restitution is the benefit unjustly received by the defendants. '4 15 Those
consumers who were not provided the Internet access they were promised
should be awarded restitution of the benefit of the fees they paid that were
not reflected in the service provided. The FTC has discretion to frame its
orders broadly to prevent the defendants from engaging in similar deceptive
practices in the future. 4 16 The FCC's decision not to fine Comcast for its
network practices 4 17 emphasizes the need for FTC action to obtain
restitution and other appropriate relief.
The legal analysis of ISP refusal-to-deal policies highlights the line
between the FTC's jurisdiction and the FCC's role in net neutrality and
network management. The deceptive conduct provisions of the FTC Act, as
well as the Communications Act, do not require a showing of monopoly or
market power and recognize that both consumers and the marketplace may
be harmed by practices left unchecked before such power is attained. The
FTC must act to stop marketplace deception, and use its legal authority to
obtain injunctive relief and seek restitution, where appropriate. The FTC
should also declare that ISP advertisements of unlimited data or Internet
access violate the FTC Act's deceptive conduct provisions when the ISP's
material limits on Internet use are not prominently highlighted in the ISP's
enticements to subscribers. The FCC should analyze ISP policies and
practices under the Communications Act and FCC rules to determine if they
constitute unreasonable network management or serve Congress's goals of
promoting the Internet's development, and should also prohibit deceptive
marketing. While a full exploration of the theories, law, and policy that
should guide the FCC in the examination of ISP network management
policies and broadband industry practices is outside of this Article's scope,
the FCC should examine Vonage's suggestion that it "[a]dopt a rebuttable
presumption that network management that results in the blocking or
material degradation of a service or application that competes with a service
offered by the network operator (or its affiliate) is not reasonable." 4 18 The
FCC should also examine whether refusals to deal are unlawful under the
Communications Act in its proceeding on broadband marketplace
practice. 4 19 This proceeding must examine current prohibitions on the use
415. Verity, 443 F.3d at 67 (quoting Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 340 (2d Cir. 2005)
("'[R]estitution is measured by a defendant's unjust gain, rather than by a plaintiff's loss'));
see also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Both the Commission
and the courts have recognized that consumer injury is substantial when it is the aggregate of
many small individual injuries.").
416. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965).
417. FCC Comcast Order, supra note 3, at 13,047.
418. Vonage Comments, supra note 306, at 8.
419. See Wu, supra note 169, at 391 (advocating application of the Carterfone rules to
wireless networks to bar locking devices to a single carrier and "[r]equire carriers to
allow.., the attachment of any compatible and non-harmful network device"). The FCC
declared in Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d
420, reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968), that users had the right to attach
devices to the telephone network as long as they did not harm the network. To implement
that principle, the FCC led a cooperative process through its Part 68 proceeding to develop
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of P2P and other applications to determine whether they comport with the
Communications Act.
Both the FTC and the FCC play distinctive and complementary roles in
ensuring that ISPs do not manipulate their control over a consumer's
physical access to the Internet to harm consumers, competition, or the
public interest. The FTC needs to follow the FCC's lead and exercise its
jurisdiction over ISPs to ensure that consumers get the scope and level of
Internet access ISPs promised and that ISP conduct does not harm
competition or deceive Internet application developers and providers.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has analyzed a case study of potential FTC Act claims
against Comcast to illustrate the deceptive nature of some ISP practices in
contrast to their promises. FTC enforcement in this arena would deter
deceptive and unfair practices through the threat and imposition of
injunctions and monetary penalties. Decisive action is needed by the FTC
and the FCC to ensure that deep-packet inspection, resets, slow lane
detours, and similar methods do not undermine ISP promises about the
nature of Internet access offered or limit choice and competition.
While ISP practices shifted in 2009 from resets to slow lane detours of
high-bandwidth applications such as video, the imperative of stopping and
redressing deceptive practices remains the same. The FTC must take action
to stem deceptive and unfair ISP practices to close the gap between ISP
marketing promises and practices. Concurrently, the FCC must define the
limits of reasonable network management and determine whether ISP
refusals to deal are consistent with that standard.
This Article has argued that improving ISP disclosure about the extent
and breadth of Internet access offered is a necessary but insufficient step to
standards that allowed devices such as computer modems to interconnect to the telephone
network. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll
Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report and
Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975). The program adopted through the Part 68 proceeding
"allows users to connect any terminal equipment to the telephone network if such equipment
is connected through protective circuitry registered with the Commission or if such
equipment is itself registered with the Commission." Id. at 599. Part 68's connection
standards were designed to promote access to a dominant telephone system governed by
common-carrier regulation. See Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84
N.C. L. REv. 1, 21 (2005) (freedom to connect modems and run Internet applications would
not be possible without the Part 68 rules). Although a full exploration of the principles that
should guide the FCC in its examination of reasonable network management falls beyond
this Article's reach, the FCC should consider whether the network harm standard set forth in
Carterfone and Part 68 should be used to define the limits of "reasonable network
management." See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. The FCC should also
determine whether refusals to deal, practices such as resets and slow-down policies, and ISP
conduct that unreasonably harms an application or service provided over the Internet that
competes with its services or those of an affiliate are lawful under the Communications Act.
Cf Crawford, supra note 53, at 873-77 (characterizing Internet Access Providers as "our
new access providers for general-purpose communications" and arguing that such providers
should be once again subject to nondiscrimination rules).
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guarantee that the Internet will remain open to all lawful applications.
Disclosure is not a panacea to improve Internet service or speed in light of
limited Internet competition and the prevalence of ISP embargos on use of
certain applications.
ISP ability and willingness to harness control over Internet access to
constrain consumer use of lawful Internet applications highlights the
importance of FCC and FTC regulation in this arena. Professor Yoo argued
that the Internet and its users would be better served by "[a]bandoning ex
ante prohibition in favor of an ex post, case-by-case approach [that] would
provide the breathing room for experimentation upon which technological
and economic progress depend. '4 20
Professor Weiser echoed these
sentiments, writing that "the future of telecommunications regulation is for
the FCC to reorient its mission to evaluating conduct after the fact using
4 21
antitrust-like standards."
Innovative and potentially beneficial Internet applications may die on the
vine awaiting agency ex post enforcement of consumer protection or
antitrust laws.
This is particularly so because antitrust and unfair
competition enforcement reaches only those with demonstrated market or
monopoly power, unless the defendant is charged with a conspiracy to
violate the antitrust laws. 422 Consumers, including those locked into a
contract whose terms keep changing, deserve protection against deceptive
and unfair practices under the FTC Act and violations of the
Communications Act, whether or not their ISP has market or monopoly
power.
The market power requirement rests on the theory that competition
allows consumers to choose alternatives and disciplines business practices.
Limited competition for broadband services and the growth of restrictions
on the use of certain Internet applications indicate that competition alone (in
a market that is not very competitive) cannot protect Internet consumers,
application developers who use the Internet to bring their services to
consumers, and competition itself.4 23 Nor will industry self-regulation, in

what is at best a duopolistic or oligopolistic market where ISPs have
420. Yoo, supra note 42, at 504.
421. Weiser, supra note 43, at 318 (citing JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J.
WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET

AGE 428-29 (2005)) (suggesting that "the FCC's role be limited to remedying
anticompetitive conduct rather than taking proactive initiatives"); see Howard A. Shelanski,
Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications

Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 101-02 (2007) (recommending an "ex post enforcement
regime" because some conduct may have a beneficial effect on consumers)).
422. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 208 n.1 (1959)
(noting Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal any contract, combination, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade).
423. See Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 33, at 419 ("[T]he disciplining effect of
competition-to the extent it exists-depends on the amount of competition in the local
market for Internet access services ....
").The widespread adoption of ISP restrictions on
the use of Internet applications also limits the ability of competition to protect innovation
and access to Internet applications and content.
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incentives to favor their traditional sources of revenue, substitute for FTC
or FCC action.
Limited competition tends to reinforce rather than restrain deceptive or
anticompetitive conduct. While creating more competition is part of the
long-term solution, the FTC and the FCC must make sure those competitors
do not simply adopt the same restrictive policies that contradict promises of
open Internet access.
The gap between ISP promises and practices must be closed. The FTC
and FCC must prohibit deceptive ISP practices, including those that deflect
blame to Internet applications for the ISP's network design and
management decisions.
The future of the Internet as a means to
communicate, disseminate ideas and information, and strengthen
democratic engagement will be profoundly shaped by whether ISPs are
allowed to limit use of lawful Internet applications and become the
Internet's gatekeepers.
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